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 This article examines the effects of both the pecuniary variables (such as prices) 
traditionally favored by economists and the non-pecuniary variables (such as attitudes 
and beliefs) preferred by psychologists on household recycling behavior.  In order to 
better explore what decisions households are actually making when they recycle, three 
dependent variables are examined: recycling rate, waste disposal container size, and time 
spent recycling.  The recycling rate decision is well-explained by a combination of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary variables, especially price, difficulty of recycling, and 
perceived social pressure to recycle.  Non-pecuniary variables have the least influence on 
the how much time respondents spent recycling, which depends primarily on household 
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1.1 IMPORTANCE OF RECYCLING 
Recycling programs are rising in both popularity and relevance.  As people 
continue to consume, this consumption continues to create waste, and the problem of 
effectively disposing of that waste becomes more pressing.  The ideal waste reduction 
strategy is actually to reduce consumption and therefore waste generation, but large-scale 
buy-in for this solution is difficult to achieve without a significant change in incentives.  
Given that consumption will likely continue at similar levels, viable waste disposal 
options for the household become disposing of waste in landfills via traditional (typically 
municipal) garbage pick-up programs; disposing of waste through illegal burning or 
dumping, which is undesirable because of the negative environmental and aesthetic 
externalities it causes; and recycling a proportion of that waste (Fullerton and Kinnaman 
1996).  Recycling reduces the overall waste stream by turning materials back into 
consumable goods an additional time before they must ultimately be disposed of.  It also 
slows extraction of virgin resources by providing an alternate source of production 
materials.  Both of these functions create positive net environmental externalities as long 
as the benefits are greater than the environmental costs of processing recycled materials 
into a (re)useable form.  Those costs are beyond the scope of the current analysis.   
The most recent available data from the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) allow us to characterize the scale of waste generation in the country: In 
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2008, Americans generated 250 million tons of municipal solid waste, or about 4.5 
pounds per person per day (EPA 2009).  Note that municipal solid waste does not include 
industrial, hazardous, or construction waste (EPA 2009).  Residential waste (including 
waste from multi-family dwellings, such as apartments) accounts for 55-65 percent of the 
total municipal solid waste generated in the United States; the rest is commercial and 
institutional waste from places such as businesses and hospitals (EPA 2009).  Recycling 
programs are a significant part of the residential waste disposal equation in this country, 
and examinations of optimal program design are therefore warranted.   
Many communities in the United States now have municipal recycling programs.  
As such programs become more widespread, the focus for both researchers and operators 
turns toward ways to fine-tune these programs to maximize net social benefit from 
recycling.  Incentives for households to recycle may be direct, through the recycling 
opportunities themselves, indirect, through the design of waste disposal programs, or a 
combination of the two.  Understanding how people make recycling and disposal 
decisions allows policymakers to target their programs to achieve the desired results of 
cost effective disposal and minimized negative environmental impact.  
1.2 BENEFITS OF COMBINING ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES 
To date, however, much of the relevant recycling research remains segregated 
within distinct academic disciplines.  While economists focus on the pecuniary costs and 
benefits of various recycling options (see, e.g., Reschovsky and Stone 1994; Fullerton 
and Kinnaman 1995, 1996; Kinnaman and Fullerton 2000; Jenkins et al 2003; Fererra 
and Missios 2005; Kipperberg 2007), psychologists study non-pecuniary factors that 
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cause people to decide to recycle (see, e.g., Oskamp et al 1991; Vining and Ebreo 1990, 
1992; Thøgersen 1996; Cheung et al 1999; do Valle et al 2004).  Van den Bergh (2008) 
concludes that studies using traditional variables from economics (price, income) or 
psychology (attitudes, knowledge, motivations and perceptions) but not both only present 
part of the story and therefore create results that are of limited application; both types of 
variables must be systematically combined in order to generate truly policy-relevant 
analyses.  Combining knowledge across disciplines should result in a more complete 
understanding of what influences recycling behavior, which in turn will allow 
policymakers to comprehensively address these influences when designing recycling 
programs.  For instance, utility-maximizing households will participate in recycling only 
when it benefits them.  One way for recycling to be utility-enhancing is if the program 
reduces household costs, either because it is actually the less expensive waste disposal 
option or because recycling activity is incentivized (subsidized).  This cost-reduction 
option is a very familiar household motivation in the economic literature.  Another way 
for recycling to enhance utility is by affecting the utility function itself.  Recycling may 
increase utility directly through the contribution of altruism or by giving people an 
enhanced sense of belongingness from following social expectations.  How well 
recycling programs do in terms of waste diversion or cost effectiveness depends critically 
on households’ participation; including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary variables that 
may influence household behavior provides decision-makers with better information with 
which to design recycling programs that get sufficient household participation to 
accomplish waste diversion and cost minimization goals.  Some researchers (such as 
Aadland and Caplan 2006; Halvorsen 2008; Hage et al 2009) have begun to combine 
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these discipline-specific contributions into an overarching understanding, but much 
opportunity for further study remains.   
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
 This work can contribute to the existing literature both by combining disciplinary 
perspectives and by examining the relevance of three decisions that result in recycling 
output.  The purpose of this paper is to compare the pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors 
that influence recycling decisions as represented by recycling rate, waste disposal 
amount, and time spent recycling.  This problem is examined by developing a utility 
framework for the recycling decision, then performing regression analyses for recycling 
rate, waste disposal, and recycling time that include determinants from both the 
economics and psychology literatures.  This thesis focuses on the recycling component of 
household waste management, but will also present theoretical and empirical discussion 
of waste disposal and recycling time that contextualizes the recycling rate models by 
exploring other possible conceptualizations of the recycling decision.  All three sets of 
models use an activity demand framework.  Variables from both disciplines are 
significant in this analysis, but play into different models in different ways.  Of the three, 






2. FRAMING THE RECYCLING PROBLEM 
2.1 RECYCLING AND PUBLIC GOODS 
Recycling is a desirable activity because it contributes to the public good of 
environmental quality by, for instance, reducing landfill externalities and preserving 
natural resources (Kinnaman 2006; Hage et al 2009).  Returning for a moment to basic 
theory, recall that public goods are nonrival – one person’s consumption of the good does 
not detract from other people’s consumption – and nonexclusive – excluding people from 
consuming the good is either impossible or prohibitively expensive (Nicholson 1998).  
Public goods are often underproduced by private markets because the benefits are 
distributed across users but costs are subject to free riding, where one person may benefit 
from the good provided by another (because that good is nonexclusive) without 
contributing to provision of the good themselves (Varian 2006). Public goods are 
interesting because everyone in society must consume the same amount – once the good 
is made available, it is available in the same way to everyone, regardless of differences in 
individual valuation of that good (Varian 2006).   Therefore, governments often step in to 
ensure that the public good is provided at a socially efficient level (Nicholson 1998).  
Figure I illustrates the difference between optimal public good provision for private 
provision (Q1) and public provision (Q*).  A private individual would provide where their 
demand curve (D1) intersects marginal cost (MC) at Q1, but socially optimal provision 
demands provision at the level where market demand (the vertical summation of all 
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individual demand, D above) equals marginal cost at Q*.  The good would be privately 
underprovided compared to the social optimum.  Environmental quality from waste 
reduction activities (of which recycling is a subcategory) is such a public good: each 
person’s efforts to reduce the amount of waste they create contribute to an increase in 
environmental quality, but that person cannot exclude their neighbors from enjoying the 
benefit provided by their waste reduction activity, whether or not those neighbors bear 
any waste reduction cost.  An individual would not have an incentive to provide 
environmental quality at the socially optimal level.   
Furthermore, the public good of environmental quality provides positive 


















Figure I: Efficient public good provision.  Figure based on Varian (2006). 
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but the agent has no incentive to consider these effects in her decision framework 
(Freeman 2003).  Environmental quality provides a flow of services to people, and 
changes in agents’ actions can create changes in the flow of these services, thereby 
imposing either benefits or costs on others; these benefits or costs are positive or negative 
externalities, respectively (Freeman 2003; Varian 2006).  Because environmental quality 
is nonexclusive, people benefit from that quality whether or not they contribute to its 
creation.  Negative externalities, which harm rather than benefit others, are often 
corrected by assigning property rights or using a tax to incentivize the agent to include 
the detrimental effects on others in her own decision framework (Varian 2006).  Positive 
externalities, such as that examined here, are less frequently corrected.  Unless the agent 
is altruistic – and derives satisfaction from others’ experience of environmental quality – 
this benefit to others is not included in her utility function.   
2.2 WASTE DISPOSAL OPTIONS 
There are two ways to reduce the amount of residential waste deposited in the 
environment: reduce the amount of consumption that creates waste or reduce the amount 
of waste discarded (Choe and Fraser 1998).  The literature focuses on the second of these 
options.  Households generate waste from consumption that may be disposed of in three 
possible ways: “traditional” solid waste disposal, such as depositing waste in a landfill; 
recycling; and illegal dumping or burning (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996).  Of these three 
options, both recycling and illegal dumping divert waste from landfills, but only 
recycling prevents that waste from being deposited in the environment and therefore 
provides the public good of increased environmental quality (assuming, of course, that 
the emissions created in the recycling process are less environmentally harmful than the 
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emissions resulting from that waste decomposing in landfills or ditches where it has been 
dumped).  Recycling also reduces greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution, and water 
pollution generated by making new products from raw materials (EPA 2009).  It has 
therefore become one of the preferred waste reductions solutions.  In 2008, Americans 
recycled 61 million tons of municipal solid waste, a recycling rate of about 33%, while 
“traditional” disposal of municipal solid waste in landfills accounted for 135 million tons 
of waste, or about 54% of the total (EPA 2009). 
Municipal governments tend to bear the responsibility for providing residents 
with programs for waste disposal, including garbage pickup and recycling programs, and 
much of the literature is therefore focused on informing policymaking at the municipal 
level.  Government provision of this good most likely results from economies of scale in 
recycling provision that make it more efficient to have a single provider rather than 
multiple competitive providers – that is, governments tend to provide recycling services 
because those services will be underprovided in a private market and there are natural 
monopolies in recycling service provision.  Natural monopolies occur when there are 
large fixed costs and small marginal costs (Varian 2006), meaning that it is efficient for a 
single large supplier (such as a municipality) to take advantage of the economies of scale 
that occur when these large fixed costs can be spread over a great number of customers.  
Indeed, Reschovsky and Stone (1994) indicate that natural monopolies in waste disposal 
may make it efficient for municipalities, rather than private companies, to run waste 
disposal programs, especially when the revenues from waste disposal fees are used to 
fund recycling programs.  Natural monopolies tend to be either regulated or provided by 
governments because of their cost structure (Varian 2006).  Natural monopolies are 
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characterized by decreasing average cost curves over the relevant output levels, which 
means that marginal cost remains below average cost as long as the average cost curve is 
decreasing (Nicholson 1998).  Figure II provides a qualitative illustration of good 
provision from a natural monopoly.  In the figure, the natural monopolist would prefer to 
price where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC) at P1, but this results in 
underprovision of the good relative to the socially optimal level QR (Nicholson 1998).  
Regulators (such as the municipality) would prefer that the monopolist set the price equal 
to marginal cost at PR so that the good is provided at the socially optimal level QR, but 
this results in an operating loss for the monopolist equal to the shaded area (Nicholson 
1998).  Regulators can require that price be set equal to marginal cost so that the socially 





















Figure II: Natural monopoly.  Figure based on Nicholson (1998). 
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monopolist, or the municipality itself may assume responsibility for recycling provision.  
That is in fact what is observed in the case of municipal solid waste recycling programs.  
Callan and Thomas (2004) find product-specific economies of scale for recycling that 
support the characterization of recycling services as a natural monopoly.   
 Rather than exploring who provides recycling services, however, the economic 
literature has generally taken the existence of a recycling program as given and focused 
instead on creating a cost-efficient recycling program by asking which type of program 
(curbside vs. drop-off, bag/tag vs. subscription, et cetera) induces people to recycle the 
most, and how much it costs to accomplish.  One might expect these questions to be 
explored at the firm/municipality level and to therefore examine the municipality’s 
problem.  In a situation devoid of natural monopoly, the firm’s problem would be 
maximizing profit given costs.  In the situation of natural monopoly, the municipality’s 
problem becomes trickier to characterize.  Rather than maximize profit, the 
municipality’s objective is to remedy the market failure that results in sub-optimal good 
provision while minimizing costs.  However, rather than explore the municipality’s 
problem, the literature instead focuses on the household problem, even for recycling 
program design analyses, because “households are the decision-making units that are the 
target of recycling policies” (Jenkins et al 2003, 296) and understanding how they decide 
to recycle indicates what traits are important in recycling program design.  Consequently, 





2.3 THE HOUSEHOLD PROBLEM IN RECYCLING 
The household’s problem is to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint (Nicholson 
1998, Varian 2006).  Utility depends on the amount of goods consumed, organized 
according to the individual/household’s preference ranking (Nicholson 1998).  The 
conceptualization of the utility function can be shifted to highlight variables of interest 
for a particular line of questioning.  In the case of recycling, utility can be understood to 
be a function of the household’s consumption of activities, their household maintenance 
activities, the amount of recyclable household waste (generated by consumption) that the 
household actually recycles, and the amount of the public good of environmental quality.  
The resulting utility function is U = U(X, h, r, Z), where X is the vector of consumption 
activities, h is the vector of household maintenance activities, r is the recycling rate, and 
Z is the public good.  This model will be discussed in greater depth in Section 6.1.  
Formulating utility this way allows the researcher to focus on the decision of interest, the 
disposal decision, as part of the broader utility framework.  Utility maximization is 
always subject to a budget constraint.  This budget constraint, too, can be conceptualized 
in multiple ways according to the question of interest.  In the case of recycling, both the 
money budget and the time budget are potentially important.  When the budget constraint 
is constructed in terms of the money budget, it takes the general form M = PX, where M 
is the household’s income, P is the vector of prices corresponding to each good 
consumed, and X is the vector of consumption goods (Nicholson 1998; Varian 2006).  
For the present application, the money budget takes the form M = PX ⋅ X + Ph ⋅ h + Pd ⋅ 
(1 – r ⋅ θ(X)), which includes corresponding prices for the variables discussed above 
(assuming that costs involved with contributing to the public good, Z, are subsumed in 
the costs of recycling – the way households make that contribution – and costs for 
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consuming the public good are zero).  The household spends its full income on these 
activities (Nicholson 1998).  Examination of the time budget hypothesizes that 
households actually decide how much time to allocate to recycling activity vs. work and 
leisure.  In this case, there are actually two time budgets to allow different time values on 
recycling and household maintenance activity vs. consumption activity.  The price 
vectors are measured in time rather than money for these budgets; basically, they are the 
opportunity cost of consuming a particular good.  Those time budgets take the forms T1 = 
tX ⋅ X and T2 = th ⋅ h + tr ⋅ r where the variables ti are the time costs corresponding to 
each activity.  It is appropriate to examine these time budgets rather than the money 
budget when the choice variable of interest is time spent recycling rather than recycling 
rate.  The utility and budgeting decisions for this study will be examined in more detail in 
the theoretical model section. 
As discussed above, the literature tends to examine recycling program 
construction in terms of determinants of the household recycling decision.  Researchers 
include various program design options as potential determinants of recycling behavior in 
the household equation, and then make program design recommendations based on the 
relative effectiveness of each design option in increasing (typically) the amount of 
materials recycled.  Important variables in these models include those characterizing the 
type of program, the cost per unit of waste disposal, and the socio-demographics of 
potential recyclers.  Studies may be broadly categorized into those that examine the waste 
disposal decision – i.e., disposing of all municipal solid waste in a landfill vs. recycling a 
percentage of waste – and those that examine the waste disposal program attributes that 
influence the recycling decision – i.e., the type of recycling program design that 
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maximizes the recycling percentage in a given area.  Studies in the first category are the 
province of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995, 1996) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000).  
Studies in the latter category include Reschovsky and Stone (1994); Jenkins et al (2003); 
Kipperberg (2007); and Fererra and Missios (2005).  Socio-demographic variables in 
these studies include household income, whether the respondent owns their home, the 
highest level of education obtained by the respondent, household size, the age of the head 
of the household, whether the respondent is married, and whether the respondent is 
retired.  Not all studies include all of these variables, and they will be discussed in more 






3.  PECUNIARY MOTIVATIONS TO RECYCLE 
3.1 HOUSEHOLD DECISIONS ABOUT DISPOSAL METHOD 
 The first class of studies is those that examine the waste disposal decision: what 
makes households decide to recycle a given item of trash rather than dispose of it in a 
landfill?  Fullerton and Kinnaman dominate this category of inquiry, and their research 
focuses on variables consistent with the economic paradigm: the disposal options that are 
available, and the relative costs of each (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995, 1996; Kinnaman 
and Fullerton 2000).  This study characterizes such variables that capture economists’ 
concerns as pecuniary variables.  Prior to the work of Kinnaman and Fullerton, the 
literature tended to look at recycling and disposal as substitutes and the only choices for 
getting rid of waste, but these authors explicitly model the third option: illegal dumping 
or burning, which is often overlooked in waste disposal models because of the difficulty 
of data collection (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995, 1996).  Including this variable more 
fully characterizes the disposal decision, and leads the authors to conclude that a 
combination of curbside recycling pickup and a unit-based fee for garbage disposal 
successfully induces people to recycle, but the benefits from this program combination 
may not outweigh the administrative costs, especially if illegal disposal methods are not 
successfully tracked and punished (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996).  The existence of a 
curbside recycling program is more important in increasing recycling probability than is 
the existence of a disposal fee (Kinnaman and Fullerton 2000).  When these disposal 
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decisions are modeled as a series of endogenous policy choices (whether or not to create 
a curbside recycling program, what disposal fee to charge) with illegal dumping as a third 
choice, it may actually be optimal to subsidize disposal rather than charge for it – for 
example, though a deposit refund program that provides refunds if a person engages in 
either legal disposal or recycling – in order to indirectly penalize illegal dumping 
(Kinnaman and Fullerton 2000).  Increases in garbage prices have little effect on solid 
waste disposal demand, but garbage price hikes increase demand for recycling and, 
probably but not provably, illegal dumping (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996).  Allowing 
for endogeneity of policy choices (i.e., the user fees for garbage collection are set 
according to the amount of waste a city expects to have to dispose of) reinforces rather 
than counteracts these effects (Fullerton and Kinnaman 2000).  They do mention that 
social pressure – a non-pecuniary variable – may influence the recycling decision, but do 
not pursue this hypothesis empirically (Fullerton and Kinnaman 2000).   
3.2 HOUSEHOLD DECISIONS ABOUT RECYCLING  
The next group of studies examines variables that influence the household’s 
recycling decision specifically: what makes a household choose to recycle more?  The 
first recycling decision variable is most definitely pecuniary: the relative cost of recycling 
vs. disposal.  Municipalities may encourage recycling (and other forms of waste 
reduction, such as illegal dumping or composting) by charging a fee for garbage 
collection (coupled with a reduced or zero fee for curbside recycling, or the opportunity 
for residents to utilize drop-off recycling facilities).  There are three different types of 
disposal fee programs: subscription programs, where residents choose a particular size of 
container for their waste and may completely or incompletely fill this container in any 
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given week but are charged by container size regardless; bag/tag programs, where 
residents purchase either designated garbage bags or tags to affix to the garbage container 
of their choice but may dispose of as much trash as they like in a given week in these 
approved containers; and weight-based programs where the municipality weighs the 
amount of waste collected each week (typically with scales installed on the garbage 
trucks) and charges accordingly (Kinnaman 2006).  Seattle, the application in the current 
study, uses a subscription program.  Generally, results indicate that disposal fees have a 
significant and positive effect on recycling intensity (Fererra and Missios 2005; 
Kipperberg 2007).  Jenkins et al (2003) do not find disposal price to be significant, but 
this may be due to disposal fees being too low to create a reaction in their particular 
application or such fees providing only an indirect signal to recycle.  Importantly, 
Reschovsky and Stone (1994) point out that full waste disposal costs are probably not 
reflected in households’ marginal decision-making, even when externalities are fully 
internalized, in cases where households pay collectors in flat payments (such as in a 
subscription program) because payment decisions are made on a monthly or annual basis 
– when the household decides to subscribe to a particular size of container – but disposal 
decisions are made on a weekly basis when households generate an amount of waste that 
may or may not completely fill their container.  Because there is zero marginal cost to 
generate extra waste until the container is completely filled, the incentive is to generate 
enough waste to fill the container completely rather than to reduce waste without utilizing 
all of the container space for which they have paid (Reschovsky and Stone 1994).  
Furthermore, a meta-analysis of recycling studies across several disciplines – economics, 
environmental psychology, sociology, law, and engineering – found that “external 
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incentives,” which included financial incentives and perceived social influence, were the 
second most influential in promoting recycling activity (Hornik et al 1995).  
Interestingly, the researchers concluded that monetary incentives were effective at 
initiating recycling behavior but the behavior ceased when the incentives ceased; to 
promote long-term recycling behavior, personal satisfaction from recycling activity and 
ecological concern were the important variables (Hornik et al 1995).  If prices can only 
incentivize recycling for so long, it is important to explore other factors, both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary, that contribute to increased recycling behavior.  Additionally, the 
temporary effect discovered by Hornik et al (1995) may be explained by Jenkins et al 
(2003): waste disposal cost affects recycling only indirectly, but directly affects the 
disposal decision itself.  Perhaps, when faced with increased disposal costs, households 
reduce costs by recycling in the short run but in the long run change consumption 
behavior instead to reduce the amount of garbage produced (Jenkins et al 2003) – that is, 
decrease 𝑿 and therefore also 𝐺(𝑿).   
Another household decision variable is recycling program design.  Recycling 
programs are typically either curbside pickup programs, in which recycling material is 
collected at the curb weekly or biweekly (just as garbage is collected) or drop-off 
programs, in which residents must transport their recycling to centralized collection 
points.  Both types of program require space to store recyclables until they are picked up 
or dropped off, which may be inconvenient, and drop-off programs require participants to 
expend time and potentially gas money to travel to the drop-off site.  Much of the 
literature to date has focused on optimal program design, but because a given 
municipality is likely to implement only one type of recycling program, opportunities for 
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direct comparison have been more limited.  Results indicate that curbside recycling 
programs are most effective at promoting recycling behavior (Reschovsky and Stone 
1994; Jenkins et al 2003; Kipperberg 2007; Halvorsen 2008).  Similarly, curbside 
recycling programs reduce household recycling costs by increasing convenience and 
reducing storage costs relative to drop-off programs (Jenkins et al 2003).   
Other determinants of the household recycling decision are modeled less 
consistently.  These include convenience, information about available recycling 
programs, and visibility.  Convenience was explored in two studies.  Jenkins et al (2003) 
indicate that convenience may help explain the popularity of curbside recycling, but use 
program design as a proxy for convenience rather than including a variable to capture this 
attribute directly (on the assumption that curbside programs were more convenient than 
drop-off programs).  In that curbside programs had more effect on recycling behavior 
than drop-off programs (Jenkins et al 2003), results indicate that increased convenience 
increases recycling intensity.  Hage et al (2009) did explicitly test convenience using the 
proximity of recycling collection points to the respondent’s property and found that this 
was positively and significantly related to every material except plastic.  Vining and 
Ebreo (1990) found that convenience was more influential on non-recyclers than on 
recyclers: those who did not recycle highlighted inconvenience as a motivation.   
Information about the available recycling programs could include fliers about the 
recycling program in an area, block leaders who personally informed their neighbors 
about the program (Hopper and Nielsen 1991), or knowledge attained through 
observation of existing curbside programs.  Both fliers and block leaders positively 
influenced recycling behavior in Hopper and Nielsen (1991), but block leaders were 
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especially effective.  Recycling knowledge increased both actual and self-reported 
recycling behavior for Gamba and Oskamp (1994).  “Internal facilitators,” which 
included recycling knowledge, were the most influential variables on recycling activity in 
the Hornik et al (1995) meta-analysis. Whether or not an information variable is tested, 
better knowledge about available programs may be an attribute of more active recyclers, 
especially for programs that are less visible than curbside recycling (Jenkins et al 2003).  
Knowledge about the recycling programs available to respondents was important for 
Thøgersen (1996), but general environmental knowledge was not.  Note that van den 
Bergh (2008) categorizes information as a variable characteristic of the non-
pecuniary/psychological literature rather than one characteristic of the 
pecuniary/economic literature. 
Finally, a survey of the literature by Schultz et al (1995) found that variables 
related to socially visible activities were likely to influence recycling behavior.  Vining 
and Ebreo (1992) indicate that the visibility of curbside recycling programs both 
increases the perception of social pressure to recycle (because others can see how much a 
person is or is not contributing to the public good) and serve as a reminder to recycle.  
Again, visibility may not be tested directly, but may contribute to the importance of other 
variables.   
Reschovsky and Stone (1994) indicate that recycling rates were not fully 
explained by recycling program attributes in their study and implicate both time costs and 
“intrinsic returns to recycling” as other important variables.  In other words, pecuniary 
variables provide only an incomplete explanation of recycling behavior because they are 
not the only influential motivations that people have, and non-pecuniary factors should 
20 
 
also be examined.  This may be especially true in the case of public goods provision, 
where a household may have reason to be more concerned with the effects of their 
actions on others (altruism) or particularly sensitive to social or moral judgments about 
their actions in regard to that good.  Consequently, the analysis now shifts to exploration 
of the non-pecuniary variables that have been used to examine recycling behavior.  These 
variables are found predominantly in the psychology literature, although they are gaining 
ground in the economics literature as well with studies such as Halvorsen (2008), 
Aadland and Caplan (2006), and van den Bergh (2008).  Indeed, Halvorsen ties non-
pecuniary variables to the utility framework as follows:   
“Household utility is likely to be influenced by social and moral norms, since how 
we live up to these norms determine[s] our sense of self-respect and the respect 
we gain, or sanctions we receive, from the community.  Furthermore, if a norm is 
not followed, the person may have [a] guilty conscience for not complying with 
the norm.  These feelings will in turn affect a person’s utility from recycling [sic]” 
(Halvorsen 2008, 502).   
Part of the reason these variables have not previously been included in economic models 
of household recycling decisions is that it is difficult to verify that the questions 
respondents are answering are actually those that researchers think they are asking; 
however, a long history of refinement in the psychology literature should mitigate that 
issue.  Additionally, economists often use the “act as if” argument and a preference for 
model parsimony to argue that as long as a model’s results are consistent with people’s 
behavior (they act as if they are making the decisions modeled), there is no need to clutter 
the analysis with additional variables.  However, studies such as Halvorsen (2008) and 
Hage et al (2009) that find significant results for both categories of variables when they 
are jointly modeled provide empirical evidence that our understanding can indeed be 





4. NON-PECUNIARY MOTIVATIONS TO RECYCLE 
4.1 ALTRUISM 
The non-pecuniary variable with which economists are probably most familiar is 
altruism, or the possibility that an individual may gain utility from contributing to the 
public good as well as from directly consuming the public good itself.  Works such as 
Andreoni (1990) and McConnell (1997) have examined the various ways to incorporate 
altruism into the utility framework and determined that certain types of altruism do affect 
equilibrium outcomes.  Andreoni considered warm glow altruism, where utility is 
dependent on private consumption by the individual, public good provision, and the 
satisfaction that the individual receives from contributing to the public good – the so-
called “warm glow” (Andreoni 1990).  A collection of articles in the recycling literature 
(Brekke et al 2003; Bruvoll and Nyborg 2004) explored the concept of warm glow 
altruism and how it might be expanded to more fully explain recycling behavior.  Brekke 
et al (2003) used a theoretical model and a recycling-based thought experiment to explore 
how increased recycling efficiency (through, for instance, a new recycling program that 
requires less time to recycle the same amount of goods) may decrease, rather than 
increase, participation in public good provision because people will use the “extra” time 
gained through the added efficiency to do something other than recycle but will maintain 
the same level of moral satisfaction because they continue to recycle the same amount.  
Bruvoll and Nyborg (2004) added a self-image function to a model with warm glow 
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altruism to explore how appeals to the public to recycle may actually decrease recycling 
activity by raising the perceived expectations about recycling, which makes it more likely 
that people will feel like they are not meeting expectations (the authors term this the 
“cold shiver of not giving enough” – it is essentially disutility from contributing to the 
public good).   
 Alternately, McConnell defined altruism in relation to environmental quality as 
“the desire to preserve natural resources because they provide services that enhance the 
well-being of others” (McConnell 1997, 22); this definition focuses specifically on 
altruism as an element of existence value. Several of the statements used to elicit norms 
in the psychology literature could be categorized as examining this type of altruism.  
Examples include the statements “I recycle because it is a good way to contribute to 
environmental quality,” “I recycle because it is a good way to contribute to conserving 
scarce natural resources,” and “My personal actions can greatly improve the well-being 
of people I don’t know,” all of which were used in the current study.  Respondents used a 
scale to indicate their level of agreement with these statements.  Agreement with the first 
two statements indicated that the respondent explicitly linked recycling with public good 
provision and is consistent with McConnell’s paternalistic altruism, where the 
individual’s utility depends on the amount of public goods available for others to use 
(McConnell 1997).  Agreement with the third statement obviously indicates altruistic 
intentions in the respondent, and is probably most consistent with McConnell’s 
individualistic/non-paternalistic altruism, where the altruist gets utility from the general 




4.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF BEHAVIOR 
Apart from altruism, the preponderance of the non-pecuniary variables used in the 
psychology literature come from one of three theories that categorize people’s attitudes 
and beliefs: Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991), Schwartz’s norm 
activation model (Schwartz 1977; Schwartz and Howard 1980), and the New 
Environmental Paradigm of Dunlap and Van Liere (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Dunlap 
et al 2000).  Broadly, these theories examine how a person’s attitude toward a behavior 
influences their performance of the behavior.  In the context of recycling, the basic 
hypothesis is that people who see themselves as green or responsible consumers, believe 
that environmental conservation is desirable, and think that their environmentally-related 
behavior influences others will be more avid recyclers.  These theories are relevant to the 
current research because one of the contributions of this study is the combination of the 
pecuniary variables that economists traditionally examine and the non-pecuniary 
variables that have been shown to influence the household recycling decision in the 
psychology literature but are not yet common in the economic literature.  Indeed, van den 
Berg (2008) notes in his review of empirical studies of household environmental activity 
that, although such non-pecuniary variables have slowly been gaining the attention of 
economists, there is still a dearth of studies that effectively and systematically integrate 
variables from both fields, even though focusing exclusively on one or the other omits 
important information.  This section briefly outlines the three main theories from the 
psychology literature and explores the research that has been done to date applying 




4.2.1 THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR 
The Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991) stems from the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977), which traces the influences of beliefs, 
evaluations, and motivations to comply on attitudes and social norms that in turn 
influence behavior (Thøgersen 1996).  The Theory of Reasoned Action is based on the 
notion of consistency, wherein favorable attitudes toward a topic are assumed to result in 
favorable behaviors related to that topic, and unfavorable attitudes should result in 
unfavorable behaviors.  If the action, target, context and time are consistent between the 
attitude and the behavior, then attitude will be a good predictor of the behavior (Ajzen 
and Fishbein 1977).  These fundamental beliefs about a behavior are both practical, 
concerning the ease of performing and the consequences of not performing the behavior, 
and social, concerning the expectations of important others in the household or peer 
group regarding the performance of the behavior (Thøgersen 1996; Cheung et al 1999).  
The Theory of Planned Behavior expands on the Theory of Reasoned Action with the 
addition of perceived behavioral control – how difficult the person thinks it will be to 
perform the behavior given their available resources and opportunities (Ajzen 1991).  
Therefore, the Theory of Planned Behavior posits that a person’s intention about a 
behavior is determined by the attitude towards the behavior (the person’s normative 
assessment of the behavior, subjective norms (the perceived social pressures surrounding 
the behavior), and perceived behavioral control (the perceived difficulty of completing 
the behavior) (Ajzen 1991).  Those intentions, tempered by a person’s actual resources 
and capabilities, then result in the behavior itself (Ajzen 1991).  The social pressures 
portion of this model has found the most application in subsequent studies of recycling 
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behavior (Berk et al 1980; Sadalla and Krull 1995; Cheung et al 1999; Lam 1999), 
although attitudes about the environment in general and recycling in particular have also 
been studied (see, e.g., Oskamp et al 1991). 
4.2.2 NORM ACTIVATION MODEL 
Schwartz’s norm activation model examines internalized, or personal, and non-
internalized, or social, norms and their influence on behavior (Schwartz 1977; Schwartz 
and Howard 1980; Thøgersen 1996).  When a behavioral situation is introduced, an 
individual first responds to it using relevant social norms that “represent the values and 
attitudes of significant others” but are too general to prompt people to action; over time, 
however, social norms may be internalized and therefore become personal norms related 
to the situation (Hopper and Nielsen 1991, 200; Thøgersen 1996).  Personal norms are 
capable of prompting behavior because they are actually related to a person’s self-
concept; behaving in a way consistent with the personal norm makes an individual feel 
good about himself, while behaving in a way that violates that norm makes the individual 
feel guilty (Hopper and Nielsen 1991).  Furthermore, personal norms require two further 
conditions to be met before they lead to performance of a behavior: the individual must 
recognize that his actions have consequences – Schwartz calls this Awareness of 
Consequences – and that he is personally responsible for creating these consequences – 
called Ascription of Responsibility (Hopper and Nielsen 1991; Vining and Ebreo 1992).  
When both conditions are in place, an individual’s behavior will be in accordance with 
personal (and therefore also social) norms (Hopper and Nielsen 1991).  Figure III 
presents a visual representation of this model. Schwartz created the norm activation 
model as an exploration of altruistic behavior, a situation where approval of a behavior 
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(the social norm) does not necessarily translate into participation in that behavior (Hopper 
and Nielsen 1991).  Recycling is an example of such an altruistic behavior that finds 
widespread approval but more limited participation (Vining and Ebreo 1990, 1992; 
Hopper and Nielsen 1991).  Studies that specifically apply the norm activation model to 
recycling behavior include Vining and Ebreo (1990, 1992); Hopper and Nielsen (1991); 
and Hage et al (2009).   
4.2.3 NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
The New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) examines a set of values, attitudes, and 
beliefs which comprise an ecological worldview that is more pro-environmental than the 
dominant social paradigm (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Dunlap et al 2000).  The NEP 
consists of twelve statements along three dimensions: people’s ability to interfere with 
the balance of nature, limits to growth created by the scarcity of natural resources, and 
humanity’s right to dominate over nature (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Vining and Ebreo 
1992).  Dunlap et al (2000) updated the original study to include fifteen statements and 
renamed it the New Ecological Paradigm (which is also abbreviated NEP); both versions 













Figure III: Schwarz norm activation model.  Source: Hopper and Nielsen (1991). 
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concepts of humans’ fundamental difference from other animals and the possibility of 
environmental crises (Dunlap et al 2000).  As noted in Dunlap et al (2000), these 
statements do not tend to divide into five distinct factors when subjected to factor 
analysis in individual studies; instead, the results tend to be sample-specific.  Both 
versions of the NEP examine the pro-environmental attitudes of research subjects, with 
the general premise that the stronger the subjects’ agreement with scale items, the higher 
their pro-environmental attitudes, and the stronger their recycling behavior (Dunlap et al 
2000).  Environmental concern, or a pro-environmental attitude, has been shown to be an 
important motive for recycling behavior in studies such as Vining and Ebreo (1990, 
1992).   
4.2.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES IN PRACTICE 
However, the three psychology models above are hardly ever used in their 
complete forms by any researcher looking at recycling behavior.  In practice, questions 
from these theories are often combined into a set of questions that the researcher believes 
to be most relevant to people’s recycling behavior in the situation under question.  The 
theoretical justification for this practice is unclear.  Empirical support for the influence of 
non-pecuniary variables derived from these models is tested in the following studies: 
Oskamp et al (1991) found that social pressure provided by friends and neighbors’ 
recycling behavior, acknowledgement of environmental problems, and acknowledgement 
of intrinsic motivations to recycle all had positive and significant influence on whether a 
person recycled, but that performing environmentally responsible behaviors other than 
recycling and having general pro-ecology attitudes both had a negative relationship with 
recycling.  Attitudinal variables concerning recycling behavior were significant predictors 
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of self-reported recycling behavior but did not predict actual recycling behavior in 
Gamba and Oskamp (1994).  The meta-analysis by Hornik et al (1995) found evidence 
that perceived social influence affected recycling behavior. Vining and Ebreo (1992) 
found that social norms and an interaction variable for personal norms and awareness of 
consequences had positive and significant relationships with recycling behavior in a 
curbside recycling program, while awareness of consequences was negatively and 
significantly related.  These results contrast with those in an earlier study by the same 
authors that found that social influences were not important to recycling behavior, but 
may not be inconsistent because the only type of recycling program available to 
participants in the earlier study was drop-off recycling, which does not expose a person’s 
recycling behavior to public scrutiny in the same way that curbside recycling does 
(Vining and Ebreo 1990).  Hopper and Nielsen (1991) found that awareness of the 
consequences of recycling and personal norms about recycling both increased recycling 
frequency.  Aadland and Caplan (2006) found that those who believe they have an ethical 
duty to help the environment and belong to an environmental organization have the 
highest willingness to pay for curbside recycling.  Strong moral norms (people’s desire to 
be considered socially responsible by themselves and others) increased recycling effort in 
Halvorsen (2008).  Hage et al (2009) found that social norms, as measured by agreement 
with the statement “Important persons close to me want me to recycle,” did not have a 
statistically significant effect on recycling behavior but moral norms, measured by 
agreement with the statement “I recognize a moral obligation to recycle,” were positive 
and significant for recycling paper, plastic, glass and metal.  Finally, the meta-analysis by 
Schultz et al (1995) found that variables related to socially visible activities were likely to 
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influence recycling behavior.  Schultz et al (1995) also make the excellent point that 
studies of social norms should include characteristics of the community, although none 
apparently do.    
 In summary, the recycling literature in economics has historically focused on 
external motivations for recycling such as the relative costs of recycling vs. traditional 
waste disposal, how the recycling program is designed, and whether that design is 
incentive-compatible.  Altruism has been addressed by both economics and psychology 
literatures, but is applied to recycling primarily in the psychology literature.  Non-
pecuniary determinants of recycling tend to fall in the domain of psychology, which is 
more comfortable exploring internal motivations for recycling behavior.  Such variables 
include the attitudes a person holds about recycling and other environmental activity, 
social expectations set by the person’s community or peer group, and environmental 
values.  Various researchers have found all of these different motivations to be significant 
determinants of recycling behavior, although the relative absence of studies combining 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary variables means that the relative importance of each type of 
variable for recycling behavior is still unknown.  By examining all of these motivations 
in the same model, this study can directly compare how influential each type of variable 






5. EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
5.1 STATED VS. REVEALED INFORMATION 
 Before progressing to the analysis portion of this study, there are a few 
more concepts that affect interpretation of the results.  Although “revealed preference 
variables” and “stated preference variables” technically refer to methods of eliciting 
preferences in non-market valuation studies, there are sufficient parallels to the types of 
variables used in this study to make a brief discussion of the relative merits of stated vs. 
revealed worthwhile here.  In non-market valuation, revealed preference uses purchasing 
habits (such as the amount spent on travel to a location) to determine how a respondent 
values a set of attributes that currently exist in the world.  Stated preference questions, on 
the other hand, ask respondents how much they would be willing to pay for attributes that 
do not currently exist.  The parallel here is that a handful of studies (Gamba and Oskamp 
1994; Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996) have actually obtained measurements of how much 
people recycled – this is akin to a revealed preference – while most others rely on 
respondents to self-report their recycling behavior – which is more like a stated 
preference.  Although not exactly preferences per se, these variables do measure actual 
(or revealed) behaviors and reported (or stated) behaviors and some of the considerations 
relevant to preference questions are relevant.  Furthermore, many non-pecuniary 
variables must be stated rather than revealed.  The problems associated with revealed and 
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stated preference questions can then be kept in mind when interpreting results in this 
application.  
Revealed preference variables are based on actual behavior and can often be 
independently measured by the researcher.  The main problem with revealed preference 
data is that it may be limited and difficult to obtain.  Because revealed preference data is 
based on actual behavior, it can only cover those situations which are currently present in 
the real world; other scenarios must be elicited using stated preferences (Boyle 2003).  
The benefit to revealed preference data is that it has high content validity: it actually 
measures the construct the researcher intends it to measure because it is directly 
observable and can be accurately described (Boyle 2003).  Possible revealed preference 
variables in the recycling literature include the amount of waste actually recycled, the 
types of recycling programs that exist in a municipality, and whether the respondent has 
received information about a particular program.   
Stated preference variables provide information about hypothetical, rather than 
actual, situations and must be reported by the respondent (Brown 2003).  The two 
concerns with this type of data are hypothetical bias and validity.  Hypothetical bias is the 
concern that the respondent might react differently in the imaginary situations given in a 
survey than they would actually react in those same situations in real life (basically, 
researchers do not trust that the respondents are answering carefully) (Brown 2003).  It 
can be mitigated through careful survey design and use of focus groups.  Concerns about 
validity – that the stated preference question is actually asking what it is intended to ask – 
can be addressed in a number of ways.  Criterion validity may be evaluated by comparing 
the stated preference measure with another measure that is known to be close to the thing 
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the researcher intends to measure (Brown 2003).  Construct validity evaluates whether 
the concept under consideration relates to other concepts as predicted by theory and can 
be assessed by comparing the variable of interest to other variables that should give 
similar results as indicated by theory and by looking at the relationship between the 
variable of interest and other variables that the theory says should influence it (Brown 
2003).  The benefit of stated preference variables is that they are useful in measuring 
intangible concepts.  Problems with bias and validity could conceivably affect the stated 
behaviors of interest in this study, especially if the survey designers’ intent differs from 
the respondent’s understanding of a question.  Van den Bergh (2008) encourages 
researchers to use stated preference psychological variables rather than not collect this 
information at all, even though the reliability of stated preference responses may be 
questioned, in order to inform truly optimal policy and notes (amusingly) that 
“economists have perhaps been more concerned with efficiency than effectiveness” (Van 
den Bergh 2008, 569).  
 One interesting contrast of stated and revealed variables in the recycling literature, 
as mentioned above, is in the dependent variables themselves.  Most studies use stated 
variables for the dependent variable; these typically take the form of self-reported 
recycling behavior.  For instance, the respondent indicates what percentage of a 
recyclable material their household actually recycles (as in Kipperberg 2007).  This is 
done for ease of data collection, but leaves open the possibility that the response is not 
entirely accurate.  Perhaps, when faced with a survey about recycling, the respondent 
feels pressured to present the best version of their actual behavior or incorrectly recalls 
this behavior.  On the other hand, a few studies use actual recycling behavior as the 
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dependent variable.  In one instance, the researchers actually manually weighed the 
garbage and recycling materials that were placed on the curb each week (Fullerton and 
Kinnaman 1996).  This method has the advantage of providing accurate information on 
how much is actually recycled, but is more expensive and time-consuming for the 
researcher.  Gamba and Oskamp (1994) made the interesting decision to directly compare 
stated and revealed information about household recycling behavior.  Accordingly, they 
obtained self-reported recycling behavior from respondents (stated) and determined 
actual recycling behavior (revealed) by visually evaluating the amount of material in 
respondents’ recycling containers for two months, starting a week before survey mailing 
(Gamba and Oskamp 1994).  They found that household size, income, and recycling 
knowledge predicted actual recycling behavior, but no attitudinal variables were 
statistically significant; self-reported recycling behavior, on the other hand, depended on 
recycling knowledge and attitudinal variables but not really on socio-demographic 
variables (Gamba and Oskamp 1994).  It is worth keeping this difference in determinants 
for stated and revealed variables in mind when evaluating other studies.  Might those 
results change as well if the other type of dependent variable were used?  This is 
potentially important for future survey design and policy analysis. 
5.2 PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
 Principal component analysis (PCA) is a way of reducing a collection of variables 
to a smaller collection of linear functions of those variables while retaining as much 
variation as possible from the original data (Darlington 1997; Jolliffe 2002).  This method 
is well-established in the psychological literature and has been widely used (along with 
its cousin, factor analysis) to study recycling behavior, especially when the researcher 
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includes attitude statements from the New Ecological Paradigm, Theory of Planned 
Behavior, or Schwartz’s norm activation model (see, e.g., Vining and Ebreo 1990; 
Oskamp et al 1991; Gamba and Oskamp 1994; do Valle et al 2004, Barr and Gilg 2006).   
 Principal component analysis is often conflated with factor analysis and the terms 
are often used interchangeably, but each method answers a distinct question: principal 
component analysis uses a smaller set of variables to summarize a larger set as explained 
above, while factor analysis looks for underlying unobserved (latent) variables that 
explain a larger set of observed variables (Darlington 1997; Fabrigar et al 1999).  
Principal component analysis does not distinguish between the proportions of all the 
variables that are explained by the component (common variance) and the proportions 
that are not (unique variance), while factor analysis does distinguish between the two 
(Darlington 1997; Fabrigar et al 1999).  This assumed lack of random variance is a 
primary criticism of principal component analysis (Fabrigar et al 1999).   
 This analysis will follow Jolliffe (2002) closely for a mathematical explanation of 
principal component analysis.  Note that the letters used to denote variables here have no 
relation to the notation used in the theoretical model below.  In this instance, suppose that 
x is a matrix of p random variables.  The purpose of principal component analysis is to 
find m < p derived variables that preserve most of the information provided by the 
correlations and variances in x.  The idea is to find a linear function α1’x of x that has 
maximum variance and where α1 is a vector of p constants:  
 α1’x = α11x1 + α12x2 + … + α1pxp = ∑j=1 to p α1jxj. 
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This function maximizes variance on a line, but some variance remains.  It is then 
necessary to find another linear function that maximizes the remaining variance on 
another line: a linear function α2’x of x that is uncorrelated with α1’x and has maximum 
variance.  Again, some variance remains, so this process is continued until there are αk’x 
linear functions.  Each linear function is a principal component.  It is possible to have k = 
p principal components, but the goal is to find k = m, m < p, principal components such 
that the first m principal components account for most of the variance in x.  The vector of 
random variables x has a known covariance matrix Σ whose (i, j)th element is the known 
covariance between the ith and jth elements of x for all i ≠ j and is the variance of the jth 
element of x for all i = j:   
 𝛴 =  �
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥1 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥1𝑥2 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥1𝑥3
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥2𝑥1 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥2 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥2𝑥3
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥3𝑥1 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥3𝑥2 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥3
�. 
For k = 1, 2,…, p, the kth principal component is zk = αk’x where αk is an eigenvector of Σ 
corresponding to its kth largest eigenvalue, λk.  If αk is chosen to have unit length (αk’αk = 
1), then var(zk) = λk.  Remember that αk is the vector of coefficients or loadings for the 
kth principal component, zk.  This gives z = A’x, where A is the orthogonal matrix whose 
kth column, αk, is the kth eigenvector of Σ.   
This analysis actually finds the principal components using a correlation matrix 
rather than a covariance matrix; this allows for better informal comparison of the results 
of different analyses because the sizes of the variances of the principal components have 
the same implications for different correlation matrices of the same dimension (Jolliffe 
2002).  The principal components created from correlation matrices (rather than 
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covariance matrices) depend on the ratios of the correlations rather than their absolute 
values (Jolliffe 2002).  This changes the math just slightly: rather than working with the 
covariance matrix, it uses a correlation matrix that really gives z = A’x*.  A now has 
columns consisting of the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix and x* is the 
standardized version of x.  Furthermore, x* has jth element xj/σjj1/2, j = 1, 2,…, p, xj is the 
jth element of x, and σjj is the variance of xj.  So the covariance matrix for x* is the 
correlation matrix of x.  Because x* is not an orthogonal transformation of x (although it 
is a simple transformation of x), the principal components found for x* are not the same 
principal components found for x (Jolliffe 2002).   
There are infinitely many linear functions zk (principal components) of the 
original variables that summarize those variables, so the choice of the “best” function is 
based on three criteria: “First, the m derived linear functions must be mutually 
uncorrelated.  Second, any set of m linear functions must include the functions of a 
smaller set…. Third, the squared weights defining each linear function must sum to 1” 
(Darlington 1997, 13).   One way to choose the number of principal components is by 
rotating the matrix of principal components in multidimensional space to reorganize the 
loadings and make the factors easier to interpret (Darlington 1997).   Rotation 
redistributes the maximized total variance more evenly over the rotated components than 
would have otherwise been the case (Jolliffe 2002).  Using the concept of simple 
structure, the matrix is rotated until each principal component is “defined by a subset of 
measured variables that ha[ve] large loadings relative to the other measured variables 
(i.e., high within-factor variability in loadings) and in which each measured variable 
loaded highly on only a subset of the common factors (i.e., low factorial complexity in 
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defining variables)” (Fabrigar et al 1999, 281).  This method chooses the simplest set of 
principal components, where simple means that the number of predictor variables is 
minimized (Darlington 1997).  The first several principal components will then retain 
most of the variation from the entire original set of variables (Jolliffe 2002).  Orthogonal 
rotation specifies that the principal components remain uncorrelated with each other; 
varimax rotation is the type of orthogonal rotation that is most popular in psychological 
research (Darlington 1997; Fabrigar et al 1999).  This smaller set of variables can then be 
used in place of the original variables without much loss of information in subsequent 
analysis.   
Performing this process on the set of 25 attitude statements for this study yielded 
seven principal components with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1, and those 
principal components were then named according to which statements loaded into each 
principal component at 0.500 or above.  Each of the statements shown loads into every 
principal component according to the loading value shown in the table, but the principal 
components are conceptualized according to the statements that load most heavily in each 
respective component.  Five statements did not load significantly into any principal 
component and are dropped from further analyses.  Table I presents the twenty remaining 
attitude statements and the resulting principal components.  Together, these principal 
components cumulatively explain 56% of the total variance. 
The seven principal components in this analysis are internal motivation, difficulty, 
individualistic orientation, environmental orientation, external motivation, 
resourcefulness, and social concern.  The internal motivation component describes a 
 














I recycle because it is a good way to contribute to preserving 
environmental quality.
0.863 -0.135 -0.026 0.091 0.056 -0.021 -0.055
I recycle because it is a good way to contribute to conserving scarce 
natural resources.
0.827 -0.138 -0.061 0.166 0.090 -0.011 -0.073
I recycle because I want to be a socially responsible person. 0.766 -0.088 -0.125 0.078 0.146 -0.131 0.084
I recycle because, regardless of what other people might think, I feel it 
is my ethical duty.
0.755 -0.098 -0.157 0.132 0.171 -0.058 0.084
My personal actions can greatly improve the well-being of people I 
don't know.
0.512 0.021 -0.394 0.149 -0.110 0.314 0.072
It [recycling] takes too much time. -0.103 0.731 0.008 -0.027 -0.004 0.148 -0.137
It is difficult to find room/space for temporarily storing recyclable 
items.
-0.154 0.675 0.007 -0.013 0.008 -0.009 -0.091
It is often difficult to know what items can or cannot be recycled. 0.107 0.663 0.026 0.023 0.043 -0.090 -0.030
I don't have enough recyclables. -0.136 0.623 0.027 -0.119 0.183 0.018 0.190
My responsibility is to provide only for my family and myself. -0.097 0.014 0.757 -0.174 0.088 -0.017 -0.117
Contributions to community organizations rarely improve the lives of 
others.
-0.129 0.116 0.688 0.099 -0.126 0.104 0.046
The individual alone is responsible for his or her well-being in life. -0.068 -0.010 0.634 -0.171 0.002 0.177 0.147
The earth has very limited room and resources. 0.123 0.100 -0.123 0.739 0.061 0.209 0.086
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 0.127 -0.199 0.022 0.638 0.030 -0.037 -0.131
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of 
industrial nations.
-0.230 0.049 0.276 -0.565 0.085 0.283 -0.148
I recycle because I want other people to think of me as a responsible 
person.
0.060 0.155 -0.054 0.016 0.759 0.053 -0.009
I recycle because I feel it is expected of me. 0.146 -0.045 -0.208 0.046 0.642 0.015 -0.122
I recycle because it saves me money since I am able to use a smaller 
garbage container.
0.088 0.056 0.254 -0.034 0.536 -0.104 0.145
Human resourcefulness will insure that we do not make the earth 
unlivable.
-0.070 -0.076 0.105 0.018 0.125 0.730 -0.038





person who cares about their impact on the environment and being the kind of “good 
person” that chooses environmentally responsible actions.  Notice that all three altruistic 
statements discussed in the altruism section above are included in this factor.  The 
difficulty component describes a person who finds practical excuses not to recycle, such 
as lack of storage space for recyclables and lack of knowledge about what items are 
eligible for recycling.  Compare this to the individualistic orientation component, which 
describes a person who finds theoretical excuses not to recycle; they do not believe that 
recycling is a worthwhile activity.  Next, the environmental orientation component 
describes an individual who strongly values the environment and acts to conserve it.  The 
statements that load most strongly in this component are all from the New Ecological 
Paradigm (Dunlap et al 2000).  The external motivation component describes an 
individual who is concerned with the tangible and social benefits they receive from 
recycling activity. Two of the highest loading statements have to do with feeling pressure 
from others: “I recycle because I want other people to think of me as a responsible 
person” and “I recycle because I feel it is expected of me.”  The third statement with a 
high loading, “I recycle because it saves me money since I am able to use a smaller 
garbage container,” indicates a pecuniary motivation and is a strange fit with the other 
two, although all three statements come from the same section of the questionnaire that 
asked what motivates people to recycle. The resourcefulness component loads on a single 
statement that describes a person who believes that human ingenuity will allow society to 
escape from the consequences of human wastefulness.  This statement is also from the 
NEP (Dunlap et al 2000).  Finally, the social concern principal component also loads on a 
single statement: that “[o]ther people are not doing enough.”  For subsequent analysis, 
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these principal components were formed into seven variables by weighting each 
component according to the factor loadings given in Table I.  These variables are added 
as independent variables in the second iteration of each equation (8) – (10). 
With these empirical considerations in mind, proceed to the next section, which 






6.1 THEORETICAL MODEL 
As discussed earlier, decisions about recycling behavior are components of the 
larger utility-maximizing decisions being made by an individual.  For the purposes of this 
study, utility can be conceptualized as consisting of a vector, X, of consumption and the 
resulting waste generated, G, which is a function G(X) of that consumption.  Of the waste 
generated, G(X), a fraction, θ, is recyclable and the remainder, (1 – θ), is not recyclable.  
A household will actually recycle a fraction, r, of the total recyclable waste, θ, that they 
create.  Figure IV presents a visual representation of the amounts of waste recycled and 
recyclable as a portion of total waste generated; relative proportions of the areas in the 
 
Figure IV: Recycling as a portion of waste generated 
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figure are arbitrary.  Thus, the amounts of waste recycled, R, and disposed of, D, by a 
household are given by R = r ⋅ θ ⋅ G(X) and D = (1 – r ⋅ θ) ⋅ G(X), which are governed by 
the mass balance equation G ≡R + D.  Waste generated is G = G(X), where X is chosen 
simultaneously with r.  It is possible to assume that θ depends on what types of goods are 
consumed, X, because some the characteristics of those goods determine whether they 
can be recycled (for instance, cardboard packaging is recyclable, but cellophane 
packaging is not) and the household does not have direct control over these 
characteristics.  The household may choose “brands” within the consumption vector in 
order to, for instance, reduce waste generated and/or increase its recycling potential, 
meaning that both G(X) and θ(X) are endogenous – that is, implicit – choices.  However, 
it is likely that most households do not really consider waste reduction potential when 
making consumption choices.  Instead, their choices are driven by household income 
(wealth), the size and composition of the household, and tastes and preferences about the 
consumption options.  By this interpretation, it is reasonable to assume that θ is 
exogenous.  In the empirical application in this study, G and θ are not known; otherwise, 
the volumes R and D could be recovered.  
There are several possible ways to conceptualize household utility in relation to 
recycling: First, if households only recycle to reduce disposal expenditures, then U = 
U(X).  This would mean a corner solution for recycling, r = 0, if the disposal fee PD = 0 
(or if PD is fixed, invariant with D).  Second, households may actually get utility from 
recycling, r (or, equivalently, R), giving U = U(X, r), Ur > 0.  This would be akin to the 
egoistic altruism formation from Andreoni (1990), where the household receives utility 
solely from their own contribution to the public good.  If the household’s utility comes 
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from both the warm glow of their own contribution, r, and from the aggregate amount of 
the public good of environmental quality, Z, then the utility formulation would be U = 
U(Xi, ri, Z) as in Andreoni’s (1990) impure altruism formulation (the subscript i denotes a 
particular household).  In this case, overall recycling in society reduces waste disposal 
(ceteris paribus), resulting in conservation of resources, fewer landfills, and fewer 
externalities from virgin material extraction and production, et cetera.  The public good 
will be a function of the recycling decisions, r, of each household Z = Z(r1, r2, …, rJ) 
where J is the number of contributing households.  Here, ∂Z/∂r > 0, albeit very small.  A 
third possibility is that households receive disutility (i.e. guilt) from disposal, D (or, 
equivalently, d = 1 – r ⋅ θ), so that U = U(X, d), Ud < 0.  This is a simplification of the 
models used in Brekke et al (2003) and Bruvoll and Nyborg (2004) that show disutility 
arising from a disconnect between a household’s actions and perceived moral and social 
obligations.  In these models, S = S(r, rMORAL, rOTHERS) represents an identity or self-
image function, where rMORAL is the perception of what the “morally correct” household 
recycling rate would be and rOTHERS is the perception of the average recycling rate of 
other households.  Note that ∂S/∂r > 0, ∂S/∂rMORAL < 0, and ∂S/∂rOTHERS < 0.  The implied 
utility function is therefore U = U(X, d, S, Z), with US > 0.  This model is a 
generalization of the Andreoni (1990) model as well.  It is equivalent to that model when 
rMORAL and rOTHERS are absent from the self-image function.  Finally, utility could be a 
combination of the warm glow utility formulation and the disutility formulation above.  
Note that r = (1 – d) / θ, so r can represent both utility and disutility from recycling. 
This study will utilize the final option of allowing a household’s recycling activity 
to cause both utility and disutility.  Household chore activities will be separated out into a 
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second activity vector, h, to allow for better conceptualization of the time budgets below.  
With this set-up, household chore activities are chosen exogenously and are separate 
from other labor and leisure choices (which are included in X).  Therefore, the utility 
function is:  
U = U(X, h, r, Z)        (1) 
where Ur captures the utility or disutility of recycling. 
 Households are constrained by both money and time budgets.  For the money 
budget, assume that exogenous labor market choices (both primary and secondary) yield 
money budget M.  Assume a stylized continuous fee on waste disposal, Pd, and no fee on 
recycling so that Pr = 0.  The assumption about the recycling fee fits this specific 
empirical application.  The strictly binding money budget constraint for the household 
can then be expressed as:  
 M = PX ⋅ X + Ph ⋅ h + Pd ⋅ d = PX ⋅ X + Ph ⋅ h + Pd ⋅ (1 – r ⋅ θ).  (2) 
There are two time budgets arising from exogenous labor market and leisure choices.  
The first time budget, T1, covers “ordinary” consumption activities.  The strictly binding 
form of this budget is:  
 T1 = tX ⋅ X         (3) 
where tX is the time price of consumption activity.  Households are likely to have their 
time divided into blocks with their own unique constraints because some kinds of time 
simply aren’t fully interchangeable (Eom and Larson 2006).  Some activities are only 
available on certain days or at certain times, like working during the normal workweek, 
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commuting at the beginning and end of the day, and not being able to sleep during the 
workday.  These different blocks of time allow for multiple values of time, so that, for 
instance, labor time is valued at the wage rate while leisure time is valued at some 
fraction of that rate.  Separating out a strictly binding time budget for household chores 
and recycling gives:  
 T2 = th ⋅ h + tr ⋅ r        (4) 
where th is the time price of household chore activities and tr is the time price of 
recycling.  The exogenous time price of recycling, tr, is interpreted as the number of 
hours it takes to recycle one percent of household recyclables within a time period (say, a 
year) relative to disposing of this waste.  Specifying two time budgets in this way 
assumes inflexibility between time spent on household chores and recycling and 
household time spent on other consumption activities; this specification is based on the 
model in Eom and Larson (2006).  This disconnect between wage rate and the value of 
time allows the marginal money value of time to be small if recycling yields little utility.  
Furthermore, the time budget T2 corresponds to the empirical variable HHTIME, where 
respondents stated the amount of time they spent on household maintenance activities, 
including recycling.   
 Given the above utility and budget formulations, the household’s choice problem 
is to maximize: 




 M = PX ⋅ X + Ph ⋅ h + Pd ⋅ (1 – r ⋅ θ) 
 T1 = tX ⋅ X 
 T2 = th ⋅ h + tr ⋅ r. 
Let V represent the resulting indirect utility function of the above.  Then:  
 V = max{U(X, h, r, Z(r)) + λ[M – PX ⋅ X – Ph ⋅ h – Pd ⋅ (1 – r ⋅ θ)]  
  + μ1[T1 –  tX ⋅ X] + μ2[T2 –  th ⋅ h –  tr ⋅ r]}.    (5) 
The first order necessary condition (FONC) with respect to household chore activities of 
a representative household (hj), assuming an interior solution, is: 
 ∂U/∂h – λ ⋅ Phj – μ2 ⋅ thj = 0. 
This FONC can be rearranged to show marginal benefits (MB) and marginal costs (MC) 
of household chores: 
 (∂U/∂h)/λ = Phj + (μ2/λ) ⋅ thj. 
The left hand side (LHS) of this equation gives the marginal benefit of household chores 
(the marginal utility of chore activities), while the right hand side (RHS) gives the 
marginal costs.  Note that the ratio (μ2/λ) ≡ (∂V/∂T2)/(∂V/∂M) = MRTST2,M  is the marginal 
money value of time for household chores and recycling.  The term ((μ2/λ) ⋅ thj) therefore 
gives the monetized time price of household chores.  Similarly, (μ1/λ) will be the 
marginal money value of time for household consumption activity.  The FONC with 




 ∂U/∂Xj  – λ ⋅ PXj – μ1 ⋅ tXj = 0. 
Rearranging this to get a MB = MC interpretation gives:  
 (∂U/∂Xj)/λ = PXj + (μ1/λ) ⋅ tXj  
Again, the LHS gives marginal benefits (the marginal utility of consumption) while the 
RHS shows marginal costs and the time cost term is monetized through multiplication by 
the marginal money value of time.  Finally, the FONC with respect to recycling 
percentage, again assuming an interior solution, is:  
 ∂U/∂r + (∂U/∂Z) ⋅ (∂Z/∂r) + λ ⋅ Pd ⋅ θ – μ2 ⋅ tr = 0.   
Rearranging slightly gives: 
 (∂U/∂r)/λ + (∂U/∂Z) ⋅ (∂Z/∂r)⋅ 1/λ = - Pd ⋅ θ + (μ2/λ) ⋅ tr.   (6) 
The LHS of this equation (6) represents the non-pecuniary aspects of the recycling 
decision, while the RHS represents the pecuniary aspects.  The marginal benefit from 
recycling is the marginal utility of recycling itself ((∂U/∂r)/λ), plus the marginal utility 
received from the household contribution to the public good,  plus the amount saved by 
recycling rather than disposing the recyclable fraction of waste (Pd ⋅ θ).  The marginal 
cost is the time price of recycling, tr, monetized by the marginal money value of time 
spent on chores and recycling (μ2/λ).  Per the earlier discussion of utility formulations, the 
marginal utility from recycling could encompass either utility or disutility; in the case of 
disutility, the marginal benefit would be only the savings from recycling.  The FONCs 
yield a Marshallian recycling rate function: 
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 r = r(Px, Ph, Pd, tx, th, tr, M, T1, T2)      (7) 
The time price for recycling can be inferred from survey questions about total recycling 
time expenditures.  In this particular empirical context, the price of waste disposal Pd is 
not continuous; instead, households choose the size of the waste disposal container and 
therefore the corresponding monthly collection fee.  In other words, container size (or 
disposal amount, D, and therefore disposal fee, Pd) and recycling amount, R, are selected 
jointly.  Choosing the can size is the same as choosing the disposal expenditures (Pd ⋅ D 
rather than D).  Can size is a long-run decision; people tend not to switch, so recycling 
intensity can be thought of as being conditional on can size.  Hence, this paper explores 
the determinants of the following variables: 
1) households’ reported recycling rate (r, or REC in the empirical model), 
2) households’ reported can size (D, or CANSZ), and 
3) households’ reported recycling time expenditures (RECT in the empirical 
model). 
The equation for reported recycling rate answers the question “what makes people 
recycle as much as they do?”, while the reported can size equation answers the question 
“what makes people choose a garbage can size?” with the understanding that the choice 
of can size determines how much material they will have left to recycle.  The recycling 
time expenditures equation answers the question “what determines how much time 
people spend recycling?”  Keep in mind that, by definition from the conceptual model, 
RECT = tr ⋅ r.  It is an outcome resulting from the choice of r given tr, not a choice on its 
own per se.  Both time spent recycling (RECT) and recycling rate, r (or REC in the 
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empirical model), are elicited in the survey.  Of course, in reality, we cannot know 
whether households actually choose recycling time expenditure, RECT, or the recycling 
rate, REC.  The empirical results give some intuition as to which one is the actual choice 
variable.  
6.2 DATA 
The data for this study come from a 2005 recycling survey of Seattle residents.  
Survey packets were mailed to a random sample of 2,012 (primarily single-family) 
households to examine their current recycling activities, willingness to pay for recycling, 
recycling program preferences, and socio-demographic information.  The survey was 
conducted by researchers at Seattle Public Utilities and the University of California, 
Davis according to the Dillman Tailored Design Method over the course of October 2004 
to January 2005 (Larson et al 2005).  The survey instrument development process 
included two focus groups of 8-10 participants each, personal interviews with 10 
individuals to hone question wording and content, and a pilot survey sent to a random 
sample of 300 Seattle residents (Larson et al 2005).  Apartment-dwellers were excluded 
from sampling for the finalized survey because they did not pay explicitly for waste 
disposal.  A total of 1,172 households completed the questionnaire, yielding a response 
rate of approximately 60%.  Surveys with critical item non-response were eliminated, 
leaving a sample of 1,036 useable responses.  This application uses only respondents who 
filled out survey versions 16-30, yielding 569 responses.  Analysis was limited to these 
survey versions because they also elicited contingent valuation questions about people’s 
willingness to pay (in both money and time) for improvements in Seattle’s overall 
recycling rate.  Responses to these questions allow an analysis of the money-time 
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tradeoff, from which values of time can be identified, allowing a monetary value to be 
placed on tr. 
There is potential for self-selection bias if the non-responders were also non-
recyclers.  However, Seattle instituted a recycling requirement in January 2005 for all 
materials except plastics (SPU 2006) and actual participation in Seattle’s curbside 
recycling program is close to 100% for single family residences and duplexes.  Excluding 
apartment-dwellers also creates potential bias.  One would typically expect apartment 
residents to be lower income, have less education, and potentially be older than the 
general population. Then again, in Seattle, it is also possible that urban apartment 
dwellers would be younger and relatively wealthy.  More information is necessary to be 
able to confidently characterize the direction of this bias. 
The majority of respondents (98%) indicated that they disposed of recyclable 
paper, cardboard, plastics, metals and glass through the curbside program.  According to 
Seattle Public Utilities, materials eligible for recycling in 2005 include: newspaper, 
mixed paper, glass, aluminum, tin, PET and HDPE bottles, ferrous metals, plastic bags, 
plastic containers, milk cartons and juice boxes (SPU 2006); the materials listed in the 
survey reflect these options.  At the time of the survey, Seattle’s recycling program 
consisted of weekly curbside garbage collection (with a monthly fee based on the size 
and number of trash cans to which the household subscribed) and biweekly curbside 
collection of recyclables with a separate container for glass.  Putting yard waste into 
garbage cans was prohibited, but the option existed to subscribe to curbside yard waste 
collection.  The Curbside Recycling Report for Seattle indicates that, on average, Seattle 
households created 70.1 pounds of recyclables per eligible household per month during 
51 
 
2005 (SPU 2006), which allows us to conceptualize the volume of materials in question.  
The cumulative average cost to the city of Seattle of collecting and sorting recyclables 
was $81.72 per ton of recyclable material; the city paid contactors to conduct this work 
(SPU 2006).  Descriptive statistics for the relevant variables are presented in Table II.  
Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dependent variables used in this series of models are the self-reported 
household recycling rate (REC), the trash can size to which the household subscribes for 
traditional garbage disposal (CANSZ), and household time spent recycling (RECT).  
Recycling rate is a categorical variable; the respondent reported what percentage of 
recyclable materials their household actually recycled by choosing a category such as 41-
50%.  The data were entered using midpoints from each category to allow coefficients to 
be interpreted continuously.  The average recycling rate was 89.0%, with 37% of the 
respondents indicating that they fell into the 96-100% category.  The next most common 
response was the 91-95% category, reported by 27% of respondents.  Only 3% of 
respondents reported a household recycling rate of less than 50%.  The second dependent 
variable used is waste disposal amount (CANZ), which is proxied by the size of trash can 
Variable Name Variable Desccription Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
REC HH recycling percentage 89.00 13.86 5.5 98
RECT HH recycling time (min/wk) 15.13 10.80 0 60
CANSZ HH waste disposal collection service level 2.64 0.81 1 5
MALE 0/1 Indicator for male respondent 0.47 0.50 0 1
AGE Age of respondent in years 50.29 15.50 18 92
EDU Respondent years in school 16.69 2.75 6 22
HHSIZE Number of people in hh 2.30 1.14 1 7
KIDS1 0/1 Indicator for presence of kids 0-5 years old 0.09 0.28 0 1
KIDS2 0/1 Indicator for presence of kids 6-18 years old 0.12 0.33 0 1
OWN 0/1 Indicator for residence ownership 0.92 0.27 0 1
HHINC HH annual gross income ($1,000) 83.93 39.33 12.5 150
HHTIME HH annual hours for hh chores (hr/yr) 908.55 722.58 52.17 4,747.47
OTHREC Perception of other hhs' recycling rate 74.85 21.19 0 98
RTPRICE Hours per year to recycle 1% (imputed) 0.18 0.15 0 1.69
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to which the household subscribes.  Figure V illustrates the available trash can 
subscription choices. The average subscription level was imputed to respondents who 
chose “other subscription” or “don’t know” or did not respond.  This variable is not 
continuous.  Fifty-three percent of households subscribed to the 32 gallon can; the next 
most popular choice was the 20 gallon can selected by 30% of respondents.  Subscription 
payments are made monthly (and subscription decisions at most monthly, but often for 
multiple years at a time) while recycling decisions are made weekly, which may create an 
incentive for households to fill their allotted can with garbage before recycling the 
remainder rather than choosing recycling activity directly.  The final dependent variable, 
recycling time, asked how many extra minutes per week the respondent’s household 
spent recycling instead of throwing items away and gave categorical response choices.  
Again, data were entered using the midpoints of the categories to allow for continuous 
interpretation; the more than 60 minutes per week choice was entered as 60 minutes per 
week, which underestimates recycling time for some respondents. The average time spent 
recycling was 15.13 minutes per week, with the most common response categories being 
6-10 minutes per week (26% of respondents) and 11-15 minutes per week (24% of 
respondents).   
 The next several variables collected socio-demographic information about the 






















subscription Don’t Know 
 
Figure V: Trash can size choices and corresponding monthly subscription prices 
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respondent is male and 0 if female.  Respondents were equally divided, with 50% being 
male and 50% female.  Age of respondent (AGE) was a continuous variable measured in 
years; 50% of respondents were between 35 and 54 years old.  Similarly, education 
(EDU) was also a continuous variable giving the number of years of schooling completed 
by the respondent.  The sample was highly educated, with 45% of respondents reporting 
post-graduate work and 47% of respondents being college graduates.  Household size 
(HHSIZE) indicates how many people including the respondent are in the household; the 
most common response was two people, with 46% giving this response.  Respondents 
also indicated how many children age 0-5 years old (KIDS1) and 6-18 years old (KIDS2) 
were in the household.  Home ownership (OWN) was a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
respondent owned their home and 0 if not; the majority of respondents (91%) were home 
owners.  Household income (HHINC) was presented as a categorical variable to increase 
the likelihood that people would respond; the data were entered as category midpoints to 
allow for continuous interpretation of the variable.  Table III presents the responses to 





Under $25,000 31 5% 0% 2 0%
$25,000 - 34,999 26 5% 1 - 20% 14 2%
$35,000 - 44,999 36 6% 21 - 40% 27 5%
$45,000 - 54,999 34 6% 41 - 60% 75 13%
$55,000 - 64,999 102 18% 61 - 70% 73 13%
$65,000 - 74,999 85 15% 71 - 80% 81 14%
$75,000 - 94,999 75 13% 81 - 85% 58 10%
$95,000 - 119,999 57 10% 86 - 90% 82 14%
$120,000 - 149,999 42 7% 91 - 95% 97 17%
$150,000 or More 81 14% 96 - 100% 60 11%
n=569 n=569
Perceived Peer RecylcingAnnual HH Income
Table III: Responses to HHINC, OTHREC 
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HHTIME asked respondents to estimate how many hours per week they spent on 
household maintenance activities or chores including recycling but excluding recreational 
time.  Responses were converted to hours per year.  The variable OTHREC asked 
respondents to estimate the categorical recycling rates of other people they knew 
personally.  These categories were again entered using midpoints to allow for continuous 
interpretation.  The most common response was that others recycled 91-95% of their 
potentially recyclable material (17% of responses); this is less than the 96-100% category 
commonly reported for respondents’ own recycling behavior, indicating that people seem 
to think themselves more comprehensive recyclers than their peers.  
In order to assess respondents’ attitudes towards the environment, altruism, and 
recycling, they were asked to respond to a series of statements similar to those used in 
previous psychological studies (see, e.g., Oskamp et al 1991; Vining and Ebreo 1992; 
Gamba and Oskamp 1994; Ebreo et al 1999; do Valle et al 2004; Hage et al 2009).  
These attitude statements capture non-pecuniary motivations for recycling behavior that 
should be able to flesh out the portrait of a recycler and help policymakers fine-tune 
recycling program presentation to achieve maximum participation.  See Table IV for a 
breakdown of these attitude statements.  The attitude statements fell into three groups: 
environmental and altruistic attitude statements (five of which correspond to the New 
Ecological Paradigm measures), factors motivating personal recycling, and factors 
discouraging personal recycling.  Responses for all attitude statements took the form of a 
five point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).  Notice the 
tendency for respondents to agree with the statements that motivate own recycling and 
disagree with statements that discourage recycling.  Also notice that all of the attitude 
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statements in the first two groups are non-pecuniary except “It saves me money since I 
am able to use a smaller garbage container,” which reflects the traditional economic  
Table IV: Attitude statements 
understanding of what motivates recycling behavior.  The third, fourth, and sixth 
statements from the discouraging recycling statement section are also motivations that 




Agreement with Environmental/Altrusitic Statement: Disagree Neutral Agree
The ecological crisis facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated 70% 16% 13%
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist 13% 20% 67%
Human resourcefulness will insure that we do not make the earth unlivable 31% 21% 49%
The earth has very limited room and resources 10% 14% 76%
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of industrial nations 82% 10% 9%
Contributions to community organizations rarely improve the lives of others 74% 16% 11%
The individual alone is responsible for his or he well-being in life 47% 22% 31%
It is my ethical duty to help other people when they are unable to help themselves 7% 22% 72%
My responsibility is to provide only for my family and myself 71% 16% 13%
My personal actions can greatly improve the well-being of people I don't know 6% 18% 75%
Agreement with Motivating Recycling Statement "I Recycle because…" Disagree Neutral Agree
It saves me money since I am able to use a smaller garbage container 31% 28% 41%
I want to be a socially responsible person 2% 9% 89%
I want other people to think of me as a responsible person 24% 41% 35%
Regardless of what other people might think, I feel it is my ethical duty 4% 11% 86%
I find it to be a pleasant activity in itself, compared to other "everyday" chores 26% 46% 28%
It is a good way to contribute to preserving environmental quality 2% 6% 93%
It is a good way to contribute to conserving scarce natural resources 2% 6% 92%
I feel it is expected of me 5% 9% 31%
Agreement with Discouraging Recycling Statement "I hesitate to recycle because…" Disagree Neutral Agree
I don't think recycling benefits me personally 82% 13% 5%
I don't think recycling provides benefits to the community/society 91% 5% 4%
It is often difficult to know what items can or cannot be recycled 43% 24% 34%
It takes too much time 78% 16% 6%
I don't have enough recyclables 85% 11% 4%
It is difficult to find room/space for temporarily storing recyclable items 64% 14% 21%
Other people are not doing enough 31% 37% 32%
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6.3 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Having explored both the theoretical model and the available data, it is time to 
discuss the empirical models.  In accordance with the objective of comparing pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary factors that influence recycling decisions, equations are constructed 
for three potential recycling decisions that can then be qualitatively compared. Each 
model is run with and without the principal component variables derived from the 
attitude statements to see how inclusion of those variables changes the fit and 
significance of the overall model.  The first set of models examines the household’s 
choice of recycling rate, in keeping with the rich recycling literature that examines how 
much people recycle (see, e.g., Hong et al 1992; Jenkins et al 2003; Fererra and Missios 
2005; Kipperberg 2007; Hage et al 2009).  It answers the question “what makes people 
recycle as much as they do?”  The model is: 
RECi = XiβREC +  ε REC i       (8) 
where Xi includes socio-demographic variables and perceptions of others’ recycling in 
the first version and adds the principal component variables in the second version, βREC is 
a conformable parameter vector, and ε REC i  is the error term.  There is no explicit cost of 
recycling in this model; consequently, a third version of the recycling rate decision is also 
calculated that includes the variables CANSZ and RTPRICE in Xi.  Recall that 
subscribing to a trash can size for waste disposal is the same as choosing disposal 
expenditures in Seattle because each can size has an associated subscription rate (that is, 
Seattle residents choose PD ⋅ D rather than D).  This choice of can size is made at most 
monthly (people tend not to switch).  Switching can size is most likely to be done with 
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changes in consumption patterns that come from structural changes in life situation, such 
as moving or a change in the number of household members from a birth, divorce, child 
moving out, et cetera.  It is likely that people do not even change their subscriptions as 
often as annually.  Switching is thus a long-run decision compared to the short-run 
(weekly) decision of how much to recycle.  Therefore, recycling intensity can be thought 
of as being conditional on can size.  CANSZ is essentially the substitute activity for 
recycling.  Additionally, the time price of recycling, tr (or RTPRICE), can be recovered 
under the assumptions of the theoretical model because recycling time (RECT) is equal to 
tr  ⋅ r and both recycling time and recycling rate, r, are elicited in the survey.  RTPRICE 
is essentially the own price of recycling. In Section 7.4, this time price is monetized 
under various assumptions for the money value of time to compute welfare measures.  
Note that this version of the model has potential endogeneity issues because CANSZ 
could be correlated with the error term in REC.  This set of models does not lend itself 
well to an instrumental variables approach to address the potential endogeneity because 
all of the variables in the CANSZ model (explained below) also appear in the REC model 
and no other variable in this dataset proxies CANSZ well enough to serve as a suitable 
instrument.  Despite being linked in theory, the correlation between the variables REC 
and CANSZ is only -0.1526.  Furthermore, running the REC model that includes 
CANSZ, saving the residuals, and testing them for correlation with CANSZ yields a 
correlation of 0.0000.  This indicates that endogeneity is less of a concern for this 
particular empirical application.  Results for this set of recycling rate models are 
presented in Section 7.1 below.   
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The next set of models examines the household’s choice of can size and therefore 
disposal amount D, disposal expenditures PD and recycling rate r.  In that this set of 
models examines the waste disposal decision directly, they follow the questions explored 
by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995, 1996; Kinnaman and Fullerton 2000).  However, they 
are also another way to characterize the recycling decision because choice of disposal 
container implies choice of recycling rate from two possible sides: either the chosen 
container is too small and people must recycle any remaining materials, or the container 
is the correct size on average but too large some weeks, in which case residents have less 
incentive to recycle because they can simply dispose of otherwise recyclable materials.  
Under a volume-based pricing program, the relationship between recycling and disposal 
is not necessarily one-to-one because of the “Seattle Stomp” where residents “cheat” on 
recycling by standing on their garbage in order to compact more waste into the disposal 
container rather than recycle those materials. The basic model used is:  
CANSZi = XiβCANSZ + ε CANSZ i       (9) 
where Xi contains socio-demographic variables and perception of others’ recycling in the 
first iteration and includes the principal component variables in the second iteration, 
βCANSZ is again a conformable parameter vector, and ε CANSZ i is the error term.  Can size 
choice (and waste disposal) is essentially a substitute for recycling.  Results for this set of 
models are presented in Section 7.2 below.    
The final set of models examines households’ potential choice of time spent 
recycling.  It may be that people would be targeting an amount of time that they are 
willing to spend on recycling activity rather than an amount to recycle because the former 
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choice is easier to conceptualize.  Or, rather than being a direct choice, recycling time 
may instead be an outcome of the recycling rate decision (REC) because choosing to 
recycle any amount means that a household must spend time actually performing this 
recycling activity.  Consequently, the model  
RECTi = XiβRECT + εRECT i       (10) 
explores the question “what determines how much time people spend recycling?”  Again, 
Xi contains socio-demographic variables and perception of others’ recycling in the first 
iteration and adds the principal component variables in the second iteration, βRECT is a 
conformable parameter vector, and εRECT i is the error term.  Results for this set of models 
are presented in Section 7.3 below.  All models for equations (8), (9), and (10) were 
estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) in STATA 8 using White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  Results were not qualitatively different 
when the models were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression or with an ordered 
probit for equation (9).  The next section examines the hypotheses tested using these 
models.   
6.4 HYPOTHESES TESTED 
 Hypothesis statements will be presented by variable (for all models), starting with 






6.4.1 HYPOTHESES FOR SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
The literature shows conflicting results for the influence of socio-demographic 
variables on recycling behavior.  Partly, this is due to the specifics of the variables and 
models used, no two of which are exactly alike.  However, qualitative examination of 
previous results can help guide expectations for the importance of those variables in the 
models tested in this study.  Furthermore, socio-demographic variables that are 
theoretically appropriate should be included in the models to avoid omitted variable bias 
regardless of prior empirical results.  
The perception that women are more likely to recycle than men is supported by 
Aadland and Caplan (2006), who report higher willingness to pay for curbside recycling 
in women.  The meta-analysis by Schultz et al (1995) indicated that gender is generally 
insignificant for recycling behavior.  Because the gender dummy (MALE) is coded 1 for 
male and 0 for female, a negative relationship with REC and RECT and a positive 
relationship with CANSZ would be consistent with the results of Aadland and Caplan 
(2006).  Formally:  
Null hypothesis (H0): βMALE ≥ 0 
 Alternative hypothesis (HA): βMALE < 0   
for equations (8) and (10) and  
 H0: βMALE ≤ 0 
 HA: βMALE > 0   
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for equation (9). The next socio-demographic variable of interest is the age of the 
respondent (AGE).  Many studies do not include this variable, and the results are mixed 
for those that do.  Some found a positive linear relationship (Hage et al 2009), some 
found youth positively related to recycling (Aadland and Caplan 2006), some early 
middle age (Reschovsky and Stone 1994), and others found age insignificant (Fererra and 
Missios 2005).  The current hypothesis is that age enters non-linearly into both recycling 
and disposal decisions:  
 H0:  βAGE = 0 and βAGE^2 = 0  
 HA:  βAGE ≠ 0 and βAGE^2 ≠ 0 
for all models (equations (8)-(10)).  More highly educated people tend to recycle more 
(Kinnaman and Fullerton 2000; Reschovsky and Stone 1994; Fererra and Missios 2005) 
and are willing to pay more for curbside recycling (Aadland and Caplan 2006), although 
the variable was insignificant in two studies (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996, Kinnaman 
2005).  Hypothesize that education (EDU), like age, will have a nonlinear relationship 
with recycling activity, giving: 
 H0: βEDU ≤ 0 and βEDU^2 = 0 
 HA: βEDU > 0 and βEDU^2 ≠ 0 
for models (8) and (10) and 
 H0: βEDU = 0 and βEDU^2 = 0 
 HA: βEDU ≠ 0 and βEDU^2 ≠ 0 
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for model (9).  Household size (HHSIZE), the number of people in the household, could 
potentially affect recycling behavior in a variety of ways.  More people in the household 
mean more overall waste to be dealt with, and therefore more work to recycle that waste.  
However, there are also more people who could technically participate in that recycling 
behavior.  If one household member has strong beliefs about recycling, this could 
influence the behavior of others in the household.  No strong trend for the relationship of 
household size to recycling behavior exists in the literature; it was significant in Gamba 
and Oskamp (1994), insignificant in Fererra and Missios (1995), had mixed results in 
Reschovsky and Stone (1994), and was not included in other studies.  The expectation 
here is that household size will have a relationship with recycling behavior, but the 
direction of that relationship cannot be confidently anticipated.  Therefore, hypothesize 
the following: 
 H0: βHHSIZE = 0 
HA: βHHSIZE ≠ 0 
for all equations (8), (9), and (10).  The number of children in the household has 
arguments similar to those for household size.  More children may create more waste but 
leave households with less time available to deal with that waste; recycling programs in 
schools may make younger people more aware of recycling activities in their own 
households and contribute positively to recycling behavior.  The present survey allows 
separation of the number of children in a household into two groups: young children 0-5 
years old (KIDS1) and children 6-18 years old (KIDS2). Use the following hypotheses:  
 H0: βKIDS1 = 0 and βKIDS2 = 0 
63 
 
 HA: βKIDS1 ≠ 0 and βKIDS2 ≠ 0 
for all models (8) – (10).  Home ownership (OWN) has been found to increase recycling 
intensity (Fererra and Missios 2005; Kinnaman and Fullerton 2000; Oskamp et al 1991).  
Ferrara and Missios (2005) speculate that this may be because homeowners value their 
communities and the opinions of their neighbors more highly than non-homeowners.  
Consequently, home ownership is expected to enter positively into the recycling activity 
equations and negatively into the waste disposal equation:  
 H0: βOWN ≤ 0 
 HA: βOWN > 0 
for equations (8) and (10) and 
H0: βOWN ≥ 0 
 HA: βOWN < 0 
for equation (9).  The persistently inconsistent performance of demographic variables as 
predictors of recycling behavior in previous literature may simply indicate that there is no 
single, overarching demographic profile of a recycler – perhaps the common aspect is 
something else, such as a set of beliefs.  The next subsection presents hypotheses for the 
pecuniary variables. 
6.4.2 HYPOTHESES FOR PECUNIARY VARIABLES 
There are differing arguments for the effects of income (HHINC) on recycling 
behavior.  As income increases, people may be able to afford someone to do this type of 
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household maintenance for them, and their own recycling behavior could therefore 
decrease.  Alternately, higher-income people may have more to spend on recycling 
programs.  Ultimately, the most obvious choice is to look at recycling as a normal good, 
the demand for which increases as income increases.  Disposal should also increase as 
income increases.  This yields the following hypotheses:  
 H0: βHHINC ≤ 0  
HA: βHHINC > 0 
for all models (8) – (10).  Results for this variable were mixed in the literature: income 
had a positive impact on the probability of recycling glass and plastic in Reschovsky and 
Stone (1994) and on recycling rate in (Kinnaman 2005), indicating that people recycle 
more as their income increases.  However, Fererra and Missios (2005) found the opposite 
result: at least one income level (different income ranges were included as different 
variables here) was negative and significant for newspaper, plastic bottles, and toxic 
chemicals, meaning that having a given income level decreased the recycling intensity for 
these materials.  Income was insignificant for all other materials in this study (Fererra and 
Missios 2005) and in Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000).  Interestingly, income predicted 
actual but not self-reported recycling behavior in Gamba and Oskamp (1994).  Next 
comes the time the household spends on maintenance activities (HHTIME).  The 
hypothesis is that households that spend more time on these types of activities in general 
will spend more time on recycling activity: 
 H0: βHHTIME ≤ 0 
 HA: βHHTIME > 0 
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for equations (8) and (10) and  
 H0: βHHTIME = 0 
 HA: βHHTIME ≠ 0 
for equation (9) because either households invest more in disposal activity, period, or 
they invest more in recycling and less in its substitute, throwing things away.    The 
recycling rate (REC) equation (8) has two additional variables not included in the other 
equations (although disposal price is implicit in the can size equation).  As explained in 
Section 6.3, RTPRICE is the own price of recycling and CANSZ is the substitute for 
recycling.  As the price of recycling activity increases, the quantity of recycling activity is 
expected to decrease:  
 H0: βRTPRICE ≥ 0 
 HA: βRTPRICE < 0 
for equation (8).  As the cost of substitute disposal activities increases, people are 
expected to shift to recycling, the alternative activity.  However, that shift may not occur 
immediately if households use the aforementioned “Seattle Stomp” to fit more garbage 
into their disposal container rather than recycling it.  This effect may also be confounded 
because people implicitly choose the amount they have to recycle when they choose a 
waste disposal container size.  This gives the following hypotheses for CANSZ: 
 H0: βCANSZ = 0 
 HA: βCANSZ ≠ 0 
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in equation (8).  Various ways of conceptualizing trash disposal cost in the literature 
came up with the result that increases in trash disposal cost lead to increased recycling 
behavior (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996; Fererra and Missios 2005; Kipperberg 2007), 
although it was not significant in Jenkins et al (2003). 
6.4.3 HYPOTHESES FOR NON-PECUNIARY VARIABLES 
The variable OTHREC, the percentage of total recyclable material respondents 
think is recycled by other people that they know personally, is intended in these models 
to capture social pressure.  The expectation is that respondents who think their peers 
recycle will feel pressure to conform and will therefore also recycle.  An increase in 
OTHREC should be positive in both the recycling rate (REC) and recycling time (RECT) 
equations, and negative in the waste disposal amount (CANSZ) equation because 
traditional waste disposal and recycling are substitutes.  Formally, that gives: 
 H0: βOTHREC ≤ 0 
 HA: βOTHREC > 0 
for equations (8) and (10) and  
 H0: βOTHREC ≥ 0 
 HA: βOTHREC < 0 
for equation (9).  Examination of the descriptive statistics in Section 6.2 above did reveal 
that, in general, respondents reported that they thought they personally recycled a higher 
percentage of their recyclable material than their peers recycled (that is, the most 
common response for REC is larger than the most common response for OTHREC).  
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Because people seem to think they are already doing a better job of recycling than their 
peers, the effect of this variable may be somewhat mitigated.  However, it is still 
expected to be important.  The perceived recycling behavior of others had positive and 
significant effects on recycling behavior in Oskamp et al (1991) and Hage et al (2009).  
Similarly, block leader programs where neighbors had responsibility for encouraging 
recycling behavior in their peers resulted in more recycling in Hopper and Nielsen 
(1991).   
Attitudes such as those captured in the internal motivation component were found 
to positively influence recycling behavior in Oskamp et al 1991 and the Hornik et al 
(1995) meta-analysis.  The internal motivation component is expected to be positively 
related to both recycling rate (REC) and recycling time (RECT).  Formal hypotheses here 
are: 
H0: βINTERNAL_MOTIVATION ≤ 0 
HA: βINTERNAL_MOTIVATION > 0 
for equations (8) and (10).   Concern for environmental impact and social responsibility 
should have a negative impact on disposal amount, enticing people to select a smaller 
waste disposal container:  
H0: βINTERNAL_MOTIVATION ≥ 0 
HA: βINTERNAL_MOTIVATION < 0 
for equation (9).  Next, the difficulty component describes a person who finds practical 
excuses not to recycle.  These sorts of practical considerations have been considered both 
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as attitude statements and as independent variables in previous studies and been found to 
be significant (Hopper and Nielsen 1991; Gamba and Oskamp 1994; Hornik et al 1995; 
Jenkins et al 2003; Hage et al 2009). Because agreement with the statements in this 
principal component indicates negative opinions (such as “recycling takes too much 
time”), a negative relationship is expected with recycling rate and a positive relationship 
with its substitute, waste disposal behavior.  A positive relationship is also expected with 
time spent recycling (RECT) because respondents who find recycling difficult are likely 
to spend more time accomplishing recycling.  This gives the hypotheses:  
H0: βDIFFICULTY ≥ 0 
HA: βDIFFICULTY < 0 
for equation (8) and  
H0: βDIFFICULTY ≤ 0 
HA: βDIFFICULTY > 0 
for equations (9) and (10).  In contrast, the individualistic orientation component 
describes a person who finds theoretical excuses not to recycle.  This component is 
expected to be negatively related to recycling rate (REC) and time spent recycling 
(RECT): 
H0: βINDIVIDUALISTIC_ORIENTATION ≥ 0 
HA: βINDIVIDUALISTIC_ORIENTATION < 0 
and positively related to waste disposal amount (CANSZ): 
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H0: βINDIVIDUALISTIC_ORIENTATION ≤ 0 
HA: βINDIVIDUALISTIC_ORIENTATION > 0. 
The environmental orientation component describes an individual who values and 
conserves the environment.  Both acknowledgment of environmental problems (Oskamp 
et al 1991) and respondents’ attitudes towards the environment (do Valle et al 2004) 
influenced recycling behavior in previous studies.  This component is expected to have a 
positive relationship with recycling rate and time spent recycling and a negative 
relationship with can size:  
H0: βENVIRONMENTAL_ORIENTATION ≤ 0 
HA: βENVIRONMENTAL_ORIENTATION > 0 
for equations (8) and (10) and  
H0: βENVIRONMENTAL_ORIENTATION ≥ 0 
HA: βENVIRONMENTAL_ORIENTATION < 0 
for equation (9).  The external motivation component describes an individual who is 
concerned with the tangible and social benefits they receive from recycling activity.  This 
component is expected to be positively related with recycling activities: 
H0: βEXTERNAL_MOTIVATION ≤ 0 
HA: βEXTERNAL_MOTIVATION > 0 
for equations (8) and (10) and have a negative relationship with CANSZ: 
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H0: βEXTERNAL_MOTIVATION ≥ 0 
HA: βEXTERNAL_MOTIVATION < 0 
in equation (9).  The resourcefulness component loads on a single statement that 
describes a person who believes that humans will be able to develop solutions to the 
damage caused by their wasteful actions.  Agreement with this component should have a 
negative impact on the recycling rate and time spent recycling:  
H0: βRESOURCEFULNESS ≥ 0 
HA: βRESOURCEFULNESS < 0. 
Although agreement with this statement should not give pause to those who prefer to 
dispose of their waste in landfills, there is not necessarily a strong reason to expect a 
positive relationship.  Therefore, hypothesize: 
H0: βRESOURCEFULNESS = 0 
HA: βRESOURCEFULNESS ≠ 0 
for equation (9).  And finally, the social concern factor describes a person who believes 
that “[o]ther people are not doing enough.”   It is possible that a perceived lack of effort 
on the part of others makes the respondent feel like he or she does not need to contribute 
either, or it could make them feel like they need to do more to pick up the slack.  
Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H0: βSOCIAL_CONCERN = 0 
HA: βSOCIAL_CONCERN ≠ 0 
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 for all three equations.  These principal component variables embody the non-pecuniary 
aspects of recycling in this study. 
This chapter developed a theoretical model of waste disposal choices under a 
utility maximizing framework.  There are three possible related decisions a household 
could be making that result in recycling: choosing a rate of recycling activity; choosing 
its substitute, the amount of disposal space available; or choosing an amount of time to 
spend recycling.  The data that will be used to test which of these decisions most 
accurately reflects behavior were then introduced.  Seattle Public Utilities chose to make 
recycling “free” by rolling the costs of the recycling program into the prices charged for 
waste disposal bins, which are tiered according to bin size; this affects the construction of 
the empirical models and introduces possible endogeneity issues.  Empirical models were 
then constructed which will be tested with and without the principal component variables 
derived from the group of twenty-five attitude statements, and  hypotheses were specified 
for the variables tested.  The hypotheses were essentially the same for both the recycling 
rate (REC) and recycling time (RECT) equations, because the influences on recycling 
activity should be similar whether that activity is chosen directly or selected indirectly 
through an allocation of time to that chore.  However, differences are expected in the 
degree to which these variables are influential in one model vs. another.  Accordingly, it 





7.  RESULTS 
7.1 RECYCLING RATE MODELS 
Begin with the set of models examining recycling rate.  Results of the recycling 
rate models are presented in Table V, and all of the final models for sections 7.1-7.3 are 
presented again in Section 8 for ease of cross-model comparison.  Note that because these 
models use cross-sectional data, it was necessary to test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the models; White’s general heteroskedasticity test indicated 
heteroskedasticity for each of these model iterations (with test values 76.086 (degrees of 
freedom = 71, p-value = 0.3182), 276.094 (d.f. = 203, p-value = 0.0005), and 478.245 
(d.f. = 206, p-value = 0.0000) for iterations one through three, respectively).  
Heteroskedasticity, or unequal variance of the disturbance terms, violates the 
homoskedasticity assumption of the Classical Linear Regression Model and means that 
the resulting estimates, although still unbiased, will no longer be BLUE, or minimum 
variance (Gujarati 1995).  Therefore, conclusions drawn from t- and F- tests become 
unreliable if OLS is still used without correction (Gujarati 1995).  Given that the data are 
a sample rather than the population and the true sample variance cannot be known, using 
Weighted Least Squares is impractical and the correction must instead take the form of 
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (Gujarati 1995).  Each iteration was 
therefore run and reported in Table V with these corrected standard errors to allow for 
reliable hypothesis testing.   
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Table V: Empirical Model Results for Recycling Rate 
 
These recycling rate models explore people’s motivations in choosing how much 
of their possible recyclable material, θ, they actually recycle, r.  Significant variables at 
the 5% level or better include education (EDU and EDU^2), household time spent doing 
chores (HHTIME), respondents’ perceptions of how much other people they personally 
knew recycled (OTHREC), the internal motivation component, the difficulty component, 
and the social concern component.  The third iteration of the model adds own price of 
recycling (RTPRICE) and the substitute price of recycling (CANSZ) without changing 
Variable T-Stat. P-value T-Stat. P-value T-Stat. P-value
Constant -6.276 -0.22 0.827 3.040 0.11 0.913 21.303 0.88 0.382
MALE -1.339 -1.20 0.230 -0.998 -0.91 0.362 -0.746 -0.73 0.465
AGE 0.388 1.46 0.145 0.041 0.18 0.857 -0.153 -0.69 0.489
AGE^2 -0.003 -1.21 0.226 -0.001 -0.27 0.787 0.001 0.57 0.567
EDU 9.019 *** 2.71 0.007 7.026 ** 2.13 0.033 6.700 ** 2.34 0.020
EDU^2 -0.236 ** -2.52 0.012 -0.182 * -1.94 0.053 -0.175 ** -2.14 0.033
HHSIZE -0.275 -0.49 0.624 -0.304 -0.58 0.560 0.505 1.05 0.296
KIDS1 -4.875 *** -2.63 0.009 -1.762 -1.00 0.320 -1.851 -1.12 0.264
KIDS2 1.147 0.71 0.478 -0.912 -0.60 0.551 -0.785 -0.55 0.584
OWN 2.523 1.00 0.316 3.090 1.65 0.100 2.806 1.39 0.165
HHINC -0.016 -1.19 0.234 -0.003 -0.27 0.788 -0.006 -0.52 0.603
HHTIME 0.002 *** 3.11 0.002 0.002 *** 2.69 0.007 0.002 *** 3.21 0.001
OTHREC 0.236 *** 6.17 0.000 0.208 *** 5.92 0.000
Internal Mot. 1.631 *** 2.78 0.006 1.496 *** 2.70 0.007
Difficulty -3.575 *** -5.05 0.000 -3.003 *** -4.35 0.000
Indiv. Orient. 0.728 1.41 0.159 0.807 1.57 0.117
Enviro. Orient. 0.828 1.60 0.111 0.713 1.43 0.153
External Mot. 0.611 1.38 0.169 0.309 0.71 0.481
Resourceful -0.091 -0.12 0.905 0.092 0.13 0.896
Social Concern 1.838 *** 3.47 0.001 1.657 *** 2.97 0.003
RTPRICE -27.990 *** -4.44 0.000
CANSZ -1.668 *** -3.03 0.003
R2 0.115 0.338 0.440
F-stat. 4.03 7.24 8.74
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
HH Recycling Rate (REC)
Est. Est. Est. 
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the significance of any other variables except the squared component of education, which 
goes from being significant at the 10% level in the second iteration to being significant at 
the 5% level in the third iteration.  Additionally, three variables are significant at the ten 
percent level for a single-tailed hypothesis test in the final iteration: home ownership 
(OWN), the individualistic orientation component, and the environmental orientation 
component.  Since choosing a level of significance, α, essentially chooses the probability 
of committing a Type I error – rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true – and there is 
a tradeoff between Type I error and Type II error – failing to reject the null when it is 
false – that can be avoided by instead examining p-values without choosing a level of 
significance at all (Gujarati 1995), p-values are also reported for all coefficients in these 
models so that the reader may evaluate results based on the observed levels of 
significance.  Increasing sample size would eliminate the necessity of making this 
tradeoff, but that is difficult to do given the data constraints of a previously completed 
survey.  Overall goodness of fit for these models is respectable, with an R2 value of 44% 
for the final iteration.  R2 always increases as variables are added to the model, but 
significant results for the F-test confirm that the model does have explanatory power.  
Furthermore, additional F-tests of the form:  
F = [(R2new – R2old) / (# regressors added)] / [(1 – R2new) / (n – # parametersnew)]  
can be used to test the marginal contribution of additional variables in nested models such 
as these (Gujarati 1995).  The F-test for the change from iteration one to iteration two 
yields an F-statistic = 23.10, which is significant compared to the critical statistic of 
F.01(8, ∞) = 2.51.  The F-test for the change from iteration two to iteration three yields an 
F-statistic = 49.67 compared to a critical value of F.01(2, ∞) = 4.61.  These statistics 
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support the addition of the non-pecuniary, own price, and substitute variables to this 
model.   
The positive and significant relationship of EDU with recycling rate coupled with 
the negative and significant relationship of EDU^2 with recycling rate indicates that more 
educated people recycle more up to a point.  HHTIME is also significant: as household 
time spent doing chores increases, household recycling rate increases.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis.  Home ownership (OWN) is significant at the 10% level for a one-
tailed hypothesis test; people who own their homes recycle more, as hypothesized.  
Notice that the coefficient on household time is small (β = 0.0002).  This coefficient is 
sensitive to units of measurement, but the size of its effect on recycling rate is interesting 
in that “it takes too much time” is a frequently-cited reason for people to not recycle, but 
once that threshold is passed, increases in the time taken to perform the task do not have a 
particularly large impact on how much more a person recycles.  The positive relationship 
of OTHREC with recycling rate indicates that the more respondents think the people they 
know recycle, the more the respondents recycle themselves, as hypothesized.  It is 
possible that people recycle competitively, increasing their effort as they think those 
around them recycle more in order to “keep up.”   
Increased agreement with the internal motivation component results in an 
increased recycling rate, again as hypothesized.  Respondents who feel strong personal 
responsibility to be environmentally responsible are more avid recyclers.  Results for the 
difficulty component are consistent with the hypothesis that people who found difficulties 
with recycling – such as insufficient space to store recyclables or inadequate knowledge 
about what could be recycled – have lower recycling rates.  The individualistic 
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orientation component is significant for a one-tailed test, but the positive relationship is 
opposite of the hypothesized inverse relationship.  The attitude statements that load most 
strongly in this component describe an individual who feels responsibility for their own 
well-being and does not see value in community organizations; one would therefore 
expect that this person would not be fond of contributions to the public good.  However, 
it is possible that the positive relationship with recycling rate indicated here means that 
people see recycling as contributing primarily to their own well-being and therefore an 
acceptable action.  This principal component is not significant in any of the models run 
on other dependent variables.  The environmental orientation component is also 
significant at the 10% level for a one-tailed hypothesis test, and this one shows the 
hypothesized positive relationship with recycling rate.  People who are concerned with 
the ability of the environment to withstand human pressures recycle a greater percentage 
of their waste.  The social concern component is positively and significantly related to 
recycling rate; respondents who think that others are not doing enough recycle a higher 
percentage of their own recyclables, perhaps because they feel like they need to pick up 
the slack.   
The time price of recycling (RTPRICE) has the expected negative relationship 
with recycling rate: as the price of recycling decreases, recycling rate increases.  This is 
the largest coefficient by far, which is unsurprising given the theoretical importance of 
price.  However, there are also potential endogeneity issues here because this variable 
was derived using RTPRICE = RECT/REC.   This could be addressed using another price 
for recycling rate, which is done, but in this case there is also potential endogeneity in the 
other price-related variable available in the dataset, CANSZ (which is a price variable in 
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that households choose a disposal fee at the same time that they choose a disposal 
container size).  The substitute activity for recycling (CANSZ), however, is also 
negatively related to recycling rate.  This indicates that this variable is actually capturing 
the circumstance of recycling intensity being conditional on can size.  As people choose 
smaller disposal containers, they increase the percentage of recyclable material that they 
actually recycle.  Again, there is a potential endogeneity problem with this variable: 
because choosing the recycling rate, r, implies choosing the disposal amount, D, this may 
be entering the same decision into the equation twice, although the recycling rate decision 
is short term while the disposal amount decision is essentially long term.  Correlations 
did not indicate that endogeneity was a problem in this specific empirical application (see 
Section 6.3). 
Viewed overall, results for the recycling rate models show both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary motivations for how much people recycle.  They are sensitive to the time 
price of and practical difficulties with recycling (RTPRICE, difficulty component), but 
they are also influenced by social pressures (OTHREC, social concern component) that 
suggest a moral or social motivation as in Brekke et al (2003).  The importance of both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary considerations echoes Halvorsen’s (2008) findings that 
strong moral norms (a person’s desire to be considered socially responsible by 
themselves and others) increase recycling effort and higher opportunity costs of time 
decrease recycling effort.  There is an interesting story in the combination of OTHREC 
(people recycle more when they think the people they know personally are avid 
recyclers), the social concern component (people recycle more when they are concerned 
that others are not recycling enough), and the internal motivation component (I am a 
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good person when I recycle): there seems to be a “lead by example” motivation for 
recycling intensity.  This is consistent with Tucker’s (1999) assertion that social norms 
are influential when a behavior is highly visible.  Curbside recycling activity is certainly 
visible; everyone in the neighborhood can observe how much recycling a household sets 
on the curb every two weeks.  Next comes an examination of the waste disposal decision, 
which is the inverse of the recycling rate decision. 
7.2 CAN SIZE (DISPOSAL AMOUNT) MODELS 
 The set of models that examines the waste disposal decision uses the choice of 
waste disposal container size (CANSZ) as the dependent variable.  Results from these 
models are shown in Table VI.  Again, White’s test indicated the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in each iteration (with test values 145.864 (d.f. = 71, p-value = 0.0000) 
and 270.411 (d.f. = 203, p-value = 0.0011) for iterations one and two, respectively), so 
results were reported using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Significant variables include the number of people in the household (HHSIZE), home 
ownership (OWN), household income (HHINC), and the external motivation component.  
Additionally, gender (MALE) and the difficulty component are significant for one-tailed 
hypothesis tests at the 10% level.  Recall that the cost of waste disposal is implicit in this 
model because each container size is associated with a subscription price.  Although the 
F-test statistic is significant, indicating that at least one of the variables in the model has 
explanatory power, the R2 value of 15% for the final iteration is lower than we would 
generally like to see.  This is likely a result of omitted variable bias; when Kinnaman and 
Fullerton (2000) modeled disposal behavior, for example, they included prices of 
alternate disposal methods such as deposit refunds at drop-off recycling centers and legal 
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requirements that either barred or required alternative disposal activities such as yard 
waste bans or legally mandated recycling requirements.  These types of consequences for  
Table VI: Empirical Model Results for Can Size 
  HH Waste Disposal (CANSZ) 
Variable Est.  T-Stat. P-value Est.  T-Stat. P-value 
Constant 2.296 ** 2.20 0.028 2.313 ** 2.13 0.034 
MALE 0.081 
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-0.05 0.960 
HHSIZE 0.170 *** 5.18 0.000 0.168 *** 5.10 0.000 
KIDS1 0.148 
 














0.309 ** -2.07 0.039 
-
0.325 ** -2.21 0.028 
HHINC 0.002 ** 2.13 0.034 0.002 * 1.81 0.070 
HHTIME 0.000 
 
0.57 0.568 0.000 
 
0.97 0.331 
OTHREC   




Internal Mot.   




Difficulty   




Indiv. Orient.   





Enviro. Orient.   




External Mot.   
   
-
0.145 *** -4.14 0.000 
Resourceful   




Social Concern   





R2 0.110       0.150       
F-stat. 6.58 




Prob. F 0.000       0.000       
*** significant at the 1% level 
      ** significant at the 5% level 
      * significant at the 10% level 
      substitute disposal behaviors were not generally relevant to Seattle at the time of the 
survey, but would, if pertinent, improve model specification.  Another relevant variable 
to waste disposal container choice that was not available in this dataset is the amount of 
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disposable waste the households actually generated.  An F-test for the incremental 
contribution of the pecuniary variables between the first and second iterations yielded an 
F-statistic of 3.20, which is significant compared to a critical value of F.01(8, ∞) = 2.51.  
In the model as it exists, gender (MALE) is positively related to CANSZ and is 
significant for a single-tailed hypothesis test at the 10% level: men choose larger garbage 
containers and implicitly less recycling.  This is consistent with results from Aadland and 
Caplan (2006) that suggest women are more avid recyclers than men.  The more 
members are in a household (HHSIZE), the larger the garbage container that household 
selects.  This makes sense, as more people typically generate more waste.  The negative 
and significant relationship with home ownership (OWN) indicates that those who own 
their homes choose smaller waste disposal containers (and therefore dispose of waste 
through alternate methods such as recycling).  It may be that home ownership induces 
people to make more careful long-term choices or makes them feel more invested in the 
environmental health of their communities. As household income (HHINC) increases, so 
does the size of the garbage container to which households subscribe.  The combination 
of results from household size and income indicates that, generally, the more stuff people 
have, the more they throw away.  The difficulty component is significant at the 10% level 
for a single-tailed hypothesis test.  The more people agree with the sentiment that 
recycling is difficult, the larger waste disposal container they choose, as hypothesized.  
This component is the only variable that enters significantly into both the recycling rate 
and disposal choice decisions.  The negative relationship with the external motivation 
component is also consistent with the hypotheses; it indicates that the more a person 
agrees that they think others want them to recycle and see them as a good person when 
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they do, the smaller the waste disposal container they will choose (which implies that 
they will recycle more).  The third component of this factor is that “I recycle because it 
saves me money since I am able to use a smaller garbage container” – those who see 
recycling as a way to save money subscribe to smaller (and cheaper) disposal containers.  
The combined importance in these models of income and both principal components with 
pecuniary aspects (difficulty and external motivation) and the absence of principal 
components with altruistic or environmentally concerned aspects paint a pragmatic 
picture of the waste disposal decision.  People choose the waste disposal container that is 
most financially and cognitively convenient to them, although they are concerned about 
others’ censure for recycling less.   
7.3 RECYCLING TIME MODELS 
 The final set of models examines factors that influence the amount of time people 
spend recycling.  Table VII presents the results of these models.  As with the previous 
models, White’s test indicates heteroskedasticity (with test values 97.481 (d.f. = 71, p-
value = 0.0203) and 248.273 (d.f. = 203, p-value = 0.0165) for iterations one and two, 
respectively) and results are reported using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors.  These models had the fewest significant variables and the lowest R2 
values (7% for the second iteration): time spent recycling is not particularly well 
explained by the variables that were included, although the F-test is significant at the 5% 
level for both iterations, so the model does have explanatory power.  The additional F-test 
for the marginal contribution of the non-pecuniary variables from one iteration to the 
next, however, yields an F-statistic = 0.63, which does not exceed the critical value 
F.10(8, ∞) = 1.67.  Variables that are significant at the 5% level include age (AGE, 
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AGE^2) and the number of people in the household (HHSIZE).  Variables that are 
significant at the 10% level include education (EDU but not EDU^2) and the amount of 
time the household spends on chores (HHTIME).   The difficulty component is 
significant at the 10% level for a one-tailed hypothesis test.   
AGE has a negative and significant nonlinear relationship with time spent 
recycling; older people spend less time recycling, up to a point.  As the number of people 
in the household increases (HHSIZE), the household spends more time recycling.  The 
more time the household spends on chores (HHTIME), the more time it spends recycling.  
Variable T-Stat. P-value T-Stat. P-value
Constant 11.690 0.98 0.328 5.983 0.48 0.633
MALE 0.063 0.06 0.949 -0.160 -0.15 0.879
AGE -0.698 *** -2.87 0.004 -0.636 ** -2.53 0.012
AGE^2 0.006 *** 2.90 0.004 0.006 ** 2.57 0.010
EDU 1.767 1.43 0.152 2.277 * 1.74 0.083
EDU^2 -0.049 -1.39 0.166 -0.061 -1.65 0.100
HHSIZE 1.400 *** 2.73 0.007 1.377 *** 2.65 0.008
KIDS1 -1.566 -0.92 0.359 -1.883 -1.10 0.271
KIDS2 0.727 0.46 0.645 0.756 0.47 0.637
OWN 2.297 1.09 0.274 2.190 1.06 0.291
HHINC -0.011 -0.89 0.373 -0.011 -0.86 0.388
HHTIME 0.001 1.62 0.106 0.001 * 1.66 0.097
OTHREC -0.010 -0.43 0.664
Internal Mot. 0.028 0.06 0.952
Difficulty 0.728 1.46 0.144
Indiv. Orient. 0.626 1.12 0.262
Enviro. Orient. -0.141 -0.32 0.750
External Mot. -0.133 -0.28 0.778
Resourceful 0.355 0.72 0.470
Social Concern -0.002 0.00 0.998
R2 0.058 0.067
F-stat. 2.36 1.81
Prob. F 0.008 0.019
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
HH Recycling Time (RECT)
Est. Est. 
Table VII: Empirical Model Results for Recycling Time 
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This result is consistent with the hypothesis.  It could mean that these households are 
inefficient at doing chores, including recycling, and it takes them more time to complete 
these activities.  It may also mean that the more time a household spends on chores, the 
more time they have to devote to recycling.  More educated people (EDU) spend more 
time recycling, which is consistent with the hypothesized positive relationship.  The 
insignificance of the corresponding squared term (EDU^2) indicates that this relationship 
may be linear rather than parabolic.  The stronger the agreement that recycling is difficult 
and time consuming (difficulty component), the more time it takes people to recycle.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis and probably means that people who find recycling 
difficult are less efficient at performing the necessary activities such as washing and 
separating recyclables.   
 Overall, this model says that the bigger the household, the more time spent on 
chores, the younger and more educated people are, and the harder they think it is to 
recycle, the more time people spend recycling.  None of the moral judgment variables 
(about oneself or others) are important in this model.  We had previously speculated 
about whether people were choosing a recycling rate or an amount of time to spend on 
recycling activity; either of these decisions would imply the other.  The variables tested 
in this analysis definitely explain the recycling rate decision better than they do the 
recycling time decision, and tentatively indicate that recycling rate is in fact what people 
choose.  This provides some empirical support for the tendency of the literature to 




7.4 CONSUMER SURPLUS 
These data also lend themselves to a calculation of the consumer surplus attained 
from recycling.  Consumer surplus (CS) measures the welfare changes that people 
experience as a result of price changes (Nicholson 1998).  It is the area under the demand 
curve and above price; it measures the excess utility that consumers retain when the 
amount they must pay for a good is less than they were willing to pay.  The area 
underneath the demand curve measures a consumer’s utility from consuming that good – 
this measurement is exact when there is no income effect and approximate otherwise 
(Varian 2006).  The Marshallian demand curve is derived from utility maximization and 
shows both income and substitution effects of a price change.  The dual expenditure 
minimization function produces the Hicksian demand curve, which compensates for the 
income effect and shows only the substitution effect of a price change.  These two curves 
are equivalent when there is no income effect.  Using the Hicksian rather than 
Marshallian demand curve yields the more theoretically accurate welfare measures 
compensating variation (CV) – which measures how much the consumer must be 
compensated for the price change so that he remains at the original utility level – and 
equivalent variation (EV) – which finds the maximum the consumer would be willing to 
pay to avoid the price change (Varian 2006).  In practice, it is typically easier to estimate 
CS from real-world data than either of these other measures (because it is easier to 
directly observe prices and income than utility) and it can be shown that for a normal 
good, CV > CS > EV (Nicholson 1998). 
Some adjustments must be made to the recycling rate equation from Section 7.1 to 
make these data amenable to consumer surplus calculations: the annual monetized 
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recycling price (FULLP) and full income (FULLINC) variables must be calculated in 
order to calculate an annual consumer surplus and a limited recycling rate (REC) model 
is run incorporating these new variables.  The time price of recycling, RTPRICE, is 
monetized by three different values for the marginal money value of time (MMVT) in 
order to create the annual monetized recycling price (FULLP).  These MMVT values are 
the reported hourly earnings rate for respondents, 1/3 of that rate, and 1/10 of that rate.  
Rather than use household income (HHINC) to monetize by the wage rate, the reported 
hourly earnings rate was used based on a survey question that asked respondents their 
wage rate per hour worked; this allows for retired people and other respondents who are 
not in the labor force to have positive time values.  Note that this variable did have many 
imputed responses, and yielded n = 569.  Using multiple MMVT values is consistent with 
the multiple time budgets (T1 and T2) outlined in the model in Section 6.1 that allow 
household chore and recycling activities to have a different value than other labor and 
leisure activities.  The resulting annual monetized recycling price is: 
FULLPi = MMVTi ⋅ RTPRICE 
where i = 1, 2, 3 corresponding to the full reported hourly earnings rate, 1/3 the reported 
hourly earnings rate, and 1/10 the hourly earnings rate, respectively.  The full income 
variable is: 
 FULLINCi = HHINC + (MMVTi ⋅ HHTIME)/1000. 
The monetized time budget (MMVTi ⋅ HHTIME) is divided by $1,000 to match the units 
on HHINC, which is in thousands of dollars.  Again, i = 1, 2, 3 with the same 
corresponding values as above.  The resulting limited recycling rate model is: 
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 REC = FULLPi + FULLINCi + RECTHR + OTHREC + AGE + EDU (11) 
where RECTHR = RECT ⋅ (52/60), a conversion of the recycling time variable from 
minutes per week to hours per year.  The annual monetized price of recycling (FULLP i) 
is the price on the demand curve in this equation.  The choke price will be denoted P*; 
this is the intercept of the demand curve.  The relevant recycling variables are applied to 
the steps used in Bell and Leeworthy (1990) for the following consumer surplus 
calculations.  Combining all demand shifters in equation (11) in the above equation 
except price and income into a vector Ω gives the demand equation:  
 REC = Ω + β FULLPi + γ FULLINCi .    (12) 
The rest of the equations presented in this section will use MMVT2 = 1/3 ⋅ reported 
hourly earnings rate as an example; the same steps are used for every MMVT value.  To 
get the empirical demand function, equation (12) is calculated using the means of all 
variables except FULLPi and FULLINCi, resulting in:  
 REC = 90.9421 – 3.1335 FULLPi + 0.0180 FULLINCi 
where Ω = 90.9421, β = -3.1335, and γ = 0.0180.  Substituting in the mean value for 
FULLINCi and solving for FULLPi in terms of REC gives the demand curve for the 
recycling percentage:  
 FÛLLPi = -29.5381– 0.3191 REC.      (13) 
A qualitatively similar demand curve is depicted graphically in Figure VI.  Solving the 
demand equation (13) using the mean value of RĒC gives the estimated price of 
recycling: FÛLLPi = 1.1345.  Finding the intercept of the demand curve by solving (13) 
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using REC = 0 gives the choke price P* = 29.5382.  The consumer surplus equation for a 
linear demand curve like that here is:  
 CS = (P* - FÛLLPi)(RĒC)(.5)      (14) 
and using the choke price, estimated value of recycling, and mean recycling percentage 
above results in a calculated consumer surplus of:  
 CS = (29.5382 – 1.1345)(89.0018)(.5) = 1263.9890.   (15)  
The total annual consumer surplus of recycling in Seattle with a MMVT of 1/3 the 
reported hourly earnings rate, or the shaded area in Figure VI, is therefore a welfare gain 












Figure VI: Consumer surplus from recycling demand function 
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$3,580 and the consumer surplus at 1/10 the reported rate is $386 per year.  These 
amounts and the corresponding monthly consumer surplus values are reported, along with 
regression results, in Table VIII.    
Table VIII: Consumer Surplus Recycling Rate (REC) Models 
 
The welfare value calculated at the full earnings rate (and, indeed, possibly even 
at 1/3 that rate) seems unrealistically high.  By that measure, the welfare gains from 
recycling far exceed any annual disposal fee; if this were true, households would have 
overwhelming incentives to recycle as much as possible.  Responses to the survey 
question for CANSZ indicate that 53% of respondents chose the 32 gallon can, which 
results in an annual disposal fee of $193; the next most frequent response was the 20 
gallon can for 30% of respondents, resulting in an annual disposal fee of $148.  The 
largest can choice, and correspondingly highest disposal fee, results in an annual disposal 
fee of $580.  It is unlikely that the welfare gain from recycling is 18 times as large as the 
disposal fee.  There is an outlying value in HHINC that may contribute to these high 
Variable Est. Std. Error P-value Est. Std. Error P-value Est. Std. Error P-value
Constant 55.804 3.894 0.000 56.452 3.903 0.000 56.720 3.903 0.000
FULLPi -1.106 0.153 0.000 -3.133 0.452 0.000 -10.244 1.499 0.000
FULLINCi 0.029 0.012 0.017 0.018 0.013 0.182 0.012 0.014 0.376
RECTHR 0.268 0.061 0.000 0.257 0.061 0.000 0.254 0.061 0.000
OTHREC2 0.232 0.024 0.000 0.234 0.024 0.000 0.235 0.025 0.000
AGE -0.058 0.035 0.101 -0.068 0.035 0.053 -0.072 0.035 0.041
EDU 0.965 0.194 0.000 1.021 0.194 0.000 1.045 0.194 0.000
R2 0.263 0.258 0.256
F-stat. 33.39 32.51 32.29
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean 
annual CS $3,580 $1,264 $386
Mean 
monthly 
CS $298 $105 $32
(Note that the second column presents standard errors rather than t-statistics)
 Reported Earnings 1/3 Reported Earnings 1/10 Reported Earnings
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welfare estimates; it was included in this analysis but will be dropped in any further work 
with this data.  These positive welfare estimates do suggest that the recycling provides 






8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 It is interesting to see which variables are consistently important and unimportant 
in these models.  Table IX presents the last iterations of the recycling rate, waste disposal,  
Table IX: Empirical Model Results for All Dependent Variables 
and recycling time decision models side-by-side for ease of comparison.  The only 
variable to enter significantly into all three sets of models is the difficulty component (at 
the 10% level for single-tailed hypothesis tests, in the cases of CANSZ and RECT).  The 
Variable T-Stat. P-value T-Stat. P-value T-Stat. P-value
Constant 21.303 0.88 0.382 2.313 ** 2.13 0.034 5.983 0.48 0.633
MALE -0.746 -0.73 0.465 0.106 1.50 0.134 -0.160 -0.15 0.879
AGE -0.153 -0.69 0.489 0.016 0.89 0.374 -0.636 ** -2.53 0.012
AGE^2 0.001 0.57 0.567 0.000 -0.95 0.345 0.006 ** 2.57 0.010
EDU 6.700 ** 2.34 0.020 -0.019 -0.16 0.871 2.277 * 1.74 0.083
EDU^2 -0.175 ** -2.14 0.033 0.000 -0.05 0.960 -0.061 -1.65 0.100
HHSIZE 0.505 1.05 0.296 0.168 *** 5.10 0.000 1.377 *** 2.65 0.008
KIDS1 -1.851 -1.12 0.264 0.207 1.56 0.120 -1.883 -1.10 0.271
KIDS2 -0.785 -0.55 0.584 -0.095 -0.77 0.444 0.756 0.47 0.637
OWN 2.806 1.39 0.165 -0.325 ** -2.21 0.028 2.190 1.06 0.291
HHINC -0.006 -0.52 0.603 0.002 * 1.81 0.070 -0.011 -0.86 0.388
HHTIME 0.002 *** 3.21 0.001 0.000 0.97 0.331 0.001 * 1.66 0.097
OTHREC 0.208 *** 5.92 0.000 0.000 -0.02 0.980 -0.010 -0.43 0.664
Internal Mot. 1.496 *** 2.70 0.007 0.014 0.45 0.650 0.028 0.06 0.952
Difficulty -3.003 *** -4.35 0.000 0.049 1.62 0.106 0.728 1.46 0.144
Indiv. Orient. 0.807 1.57 0.117 -0.004 -0.12 0.908 0.626 1.12 0.262
Enviro. Orient. 0.713 1.43 0.153 0.015 0.41 0.685 -0.141 -0.32 0.750
External Mot. 0.309 0.71 0.481 -0.145 *** -4.14 0.000 -0.133 -0.28 0.778
Resourceful 0.092 0.13 0.896 0.055 1.64 0.102 0.355 0.72 0.470
Social Concern 1.657 *** 2.97 0.003 -0.031 -0.91 0.362 -0.002 0.00 0.998
RTPRICE -27.990 *** -4.44 0.000
CANSZ -1.668 *** -3.03 0.003
R2 0.440 0.150 0.067
F-stat. 8.74 5.27 1.81
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 0.019
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
HH Recycling Rate (REC) HH Waste Disposal (CANSZ) HH Recycling Time (RECT)
Est. Est. Est. 
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persistent importance of the difficulty component indicates that it would be beneficial to 
follow the lead of Jenkins et al (2003) and Hage et al (2009) in including measures of 
inconvenience and perceived inconvenience when studying recycling behavior.  The 
number of children in the household (KIDS1, KIDS2) was not significant in these 
models.  The resourcefulness principal component was likewise universally insignificant.  
Notice, however, that non-pecuniary variables (OTHREC, internal motivation 
component, difficulty component, individual orientation component, environmental 
orientation component, social concern component) are indeed important to the 
household’s choice of recycling intensity and when traditional cost variables are 
included, the explanatory power of these non-pecuniary variables persists.  This indicates 
that such combined models do, indeed, have a place in future research that refines our 
understanding of the household recycling problem.   
 Comparing the different stories told by these models, it is evident that different 
variables influence different aspects of recycling behavior and that both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary variables provide insights into recycling behavior.  The recycling rate 
decision depends on both pecuniary variables and non-pecuniary variables, while the 
decision of what size garbage container to use is heavily pecuniary.  This is interesting in 
light of the progression of the economic literature, where waste disposal decisions were 
initially studied without much concern for non-pecuniary influences and these variables 
gained popularity when the focus shifted to the recycling decision specifically. The 
finding that self-reported recycling behavior depends on the cost of recycling, the ease of 
recycling, and other attitudes about recycling is basically consistent with Gamba and 
Oskamp’s (1994) result that self-reported recycling behavior depends on recycling 
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knowledge and attitudinal variables but not particularly on socio-demographic variables.  
This is worth noting in light of their further result that actual recycling behavior (as 
opposed to self-reported behavior) depends instead on household size, income, and 
recycling knowledge (Gamba and Oskamp 1994).  There is no direct analogy in this 
study, as information on actual recycling behavior is not available, but this analysis found 
that household size and income were important in the waste disposal decision (which is a 
revealed variable), not in the recycling decision (a stated variable), and that attitude 
variables were less important to waste disposal than to recycling.  Future research 
exploring the difference between what people say they do and what they actually do in 
this area could be fruitful.  Furthermore, the results of this study support the hypothesis 
that people choose either the intensity at which to recycle or the amount to dispose and 
time spent recycling follows from those decisions.  One of the most noteworthy results is 
that non-pecuniary variables play a larger part in the amount people recycle (REC) – a 
tangible result that is visible to those around them – than in how much time people 
actually spend recycling – a behavior that others do not witness.  This indicates that 
recycling is at least partly a social behavior, and may even be used as a signal to advertise 
how environmentally responsible a person is: others can see the amount of recyclables 
you put on the curb, but they cannot see how much time you invest in getting them there.   
 It would be interesting to repeat this study in a community with markedly 
different attributes.  As Schultz et al (1995) point out, community attributes most likely 
influence social norms.  This is partly due to people’s ability to theoretically move to 
communities that share their same values and partly due to becoming accustomed to a set 
of values through repeated exposure.  Stereotypically, Seattle residents are known for 
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having a pro-environmental mindset (which is reflected here in respondents’ patterns of 
agreement with the attitude statements in Section 6.2, Table IV) and had a reasonably 
high city-wide recycling rate at the time this survey was conducted.  Reproducing the 
findings that people’s attitudes influence recycling behavior in a community that is 
generally less environmentally enthusiastic and has different recycling program 
participation rates would support the external validity of the finding that non-pecuniary 
considerations significantly influence recycling behavior. 
 Additionally, it is possible that people’s attitudes towards the environment and 
public good contribution in general and recycling particularly relate well to how much 
they say they recycle but have less influence on how much they actually recycle, as was 
concluded by Gamba and Oskamp (1994).  In the current study, there was no direct 
measure of quantity of material actually recycled to be able to make this comparison 
because such a measure is costly to obtain.  However, allowing for such a measure in a 
subsequent study would be a valuable confirmation that people’s self-reporting is a 
reliable measure of recycling activity and that their perceptions of themselves influence 
not only their perceptions of their behavior, but the behavior itself.  It is possible to 
obliquely comment on that relationship in this study by comparing reported recycling 
rates to disposal behavior, which is a substitute for recycling behavior; this analysis found 
that different variables influence these two measures and that attitudes and beliefs were 
more important to the first than the second.  However, it would be ideal to be able to 







 In summary, comparing the influences of the same pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
variables on different disposal decisions – recycling rate, disposal container size, and 
time spent recycling – produced two broad results.  First, including non-pecuniary 
variables for people’s attitudes towards recycling and their perceptions of their peers’ 
behavior does allow researchers to more fully characterize these decisions.  The recycling 
rate decision equations especially benefitted from the inclusion of such variables; the 
explanatory power of the model as indicated by R2 more than doubled (from 12% to 
34%) when these variables were added and the F-statistic went from insignificant at the 
10% level to significant at the 1% level.  Previous studies that have looked at either 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary aspects of the recycling decision but not both have presented 
a less complete picture of household decision making.  Second, the type of information 
collected in this survey – and indeed in the recycling literature – explains household 
recycling rate decisions well but is less suited to explaining households’ decisions about 
how much time to spend recycling or how much waste to deposit in landfills.  The latter 
decision would probably be reasonably well-characterized with the addition of 
information about how much waste people generate to start with.  The purpose of 
comparing models for these three related decisions was to try to shed light on which 
decision households were actually making and which decisions followed from that 
primary decision.  Although there is no definitive test to compare these models with 
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different dependent variables, the information available in this study indicates that 
households are choosing how much to recycle rather than how much time to spend 
recycling.   
 What profile of “a recycler” emerges from this study?  The only socio-
demographic variable that was important in both the recycling rate and recycling time 
models is education: more educated people recycle more and spend more time doing it.  
Homeowners choose smaller garbage containers and have higher recycling rates.  
Households who spend more time doing chores recycle more and spend more time doing 
so.  Those who think that recycling is difficult because it takes too much time, storage 
space, or knowledge recycle less, take more time to do so, and dispose of more waste in 
landfills.  Those who are concerned about how much their peers contribute to the public 
good of environmental quality through recycling and feel like their own contributions to 
this good make them more responsible people have higher recycling rates. 
Policymakers, then, would benefit from seeing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
motivations for recycling, as these play into direct recycling decisions and, to a lesser 
degree, into the disposal decisions that indirectly influence recycling.  Better 
understanding of the interplay of these two types of motivations allows for better ability 
to target program design and publicity to meet social objectives such as increasing 
participation in existing recycling programs or building support for new programs.  
Furthermore, a better understanding of what motivates household participation in 
municipal recycling programs can potentially lead to more efficiently designed programs 
that better target both household and municipal needs, and more accurate cost/benefit 
analysis of such programs (because the intangible benefits are more fully characterized).  
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Nyborg (2003) points out that, when designing recycling programs, governments already 
use tactics other than the traditionally expected economic incentives; this line of research 
could be seen as trying to bring those tactics into economic models.  Once such variables 
are integrated into the decision-making framework, how would municipalities act on that 
information?  The importance of the difficulty component in this research (which 
includes the statement, “It is often difficult to know what items can or cannot be 
recycled”), and of program knowledge in other work (Hopper and Nielsen 1991; Gamba 
and Oskamp 1994; Hornik et al 1995; Schultz et al 1995; Thøgersen 1996; Jenkins et al 
2003), indicates that municipalities could increase recycling behavior by paying careful 
attention to how they explain program options, eligible materials, and necessary steps 
such as cleaning that must be taken to recycle those materials.  The finding that people 
are concerned with their perceptions of others’ behavior and the potential importance of 
the visible nature of curbside recycling activity to leveraging this concern into increased 
recycling behavior indicates that municipalities want to keep programs visible and could 
potentially increase recycling intensity by encouraging potential recyclers to interact with 
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